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DESERT AND DETERRENCE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE MORAL BASES OF 
THE CASE FOR CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 
• Richard 0. Lempert * 
The controversy over the death penalty has generated arguments 
of two types. The first argument appeals to moral intuitions; the sec-
ond concerns deterrence. Although both types of argument speak to 
the morality of systems of capital punishment, the first debate has 
been dominated by moral philosophers and the second by empirical 
social scientists. For convenience I shall at times refer to the ap-
proach of the moral philosophers as the moral case for (or against) 
capital punishment or as the argument from morality. 
Those who make out a moral case for the death penalty argue in 
a variety of ways that those who kill others deserve to die. 1 Indeed, 
to some it is our willingness to execute the murderer which affirms 
the high value that all participants in the debate place on human 
lif e.2 This is the essence of what is usually called the retributivist 
position. The moral argument against the death penalty starts with 
the principle that it is wrong intentionally to take human life. For 
those who regard this principle as an absolute, the fact that it is 
wrong to kill does not make it right to take the murderer's life. Op-
ponents of the death penalty correctly point out that in an era when 
the "eye for an eye" approach to punishment has been abandoned 
for almost every crime, no self-evident principle demands that it be 
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retained for homicide.3 They also make the more debatable argu-
ment that the state's action in taking a life degrades the values it 
allegedly asserts. 
Both sides of the argument from morality are concerned with is-
sues of justice.4 No principle of retribution allows the taking of an 
innocent life. Nor does the just desert theory allow personal charac-
teristics such as sex, race, or national status to dominate indicia of 
moral culpability in determining punishment.5 Retributivists justify 
the death penalty despite substantial evidence that it has been ineq-
uitably applied by arguing that inequitable application is not inher-
ent in the penalty, and that it is better that some receive their just 
3. See, e.g., Gibbs, Preventive Effects of Capital Punishment Other than .Deterrence, 14 
CRIM. L. BULL. 34 {1978). 
4. Compare Black, Reflections on Opposing the Penalty of .Death, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 
(1978), and C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 
(1974), with Gerstein, supra note 1. 
5. To my knowledge no modem retributivist has argued that unalterable personal charac-
teristics such as race and sex may be properly considered in assessing culpability for crime. 
However, we must recognize that when people are sentenced such factors may affect moral 
judgments. The reason that the vast majority of those executed for rape have been black men 
in Southern and border states accused of raping white women, see Wolfgang & Redel, Rape, 
Racial .Discrimination and the .Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
99 (H. Bedau & C. Pierce eds. 1976), is probably that the dominant majority in the executing 
states regarded such interracial rape (but not its converse) as especially immoral. Similar ra-
cial bias exists in the punishment of homicide. Thirty years ago, Garfinkel collected data on 
homicide indictments in ten North Carolina counties for the years 1930 through 1940. Garfin-
kel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-Racial Homicides, 27 Soc. FORCES 369 (1949). The data 
indicated that a black indicted for killing a white had a 29% chance of receiving a death sen-
tence. A white indicted for killing a white had a 7% probability of being sentenced to death. A 
black indicted for killing a black had a 3% probability of receiving the death sentence, and 
whites indicted for killing blacks never received the ultimate punishment. These figures sug-
gest two kinds of racial bias, harsher penalties are exacted when killers are black regardless of 
the victim's race and when victims are white regardless of the killer's race. There is also an 
interaction effect such that black killers of white victims are particularly likely to receive the 
death sentence. 
Statutes passed after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), have not eliminated these 
racial biases in sentencing. Bowers and Pierce replicated Garfinkel's basic pattern of bias for 
post-Furman executions (through 1977) in Florida, Georgia, Texas, and Ohio, which collec-
tively accounted for about 70% of the nation's death sentences in the five years after Furman. 
Bowers & Pierce, Arbitrariness and .Discrimination under Post-Furman Capital Statutes, 26 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 563 (1980). In Florida, for example, blacks who killed whites were 
more than five times as likely to get the death sentence as whites who killed whites, and white 
people who killed whites were more than forty times as likely to get the death sentence as 
whites who killed blacks. Both patterns of bias persist, although to a lesser degree, when 
murders accompanied by other felony circumstances (and thus likely to be between strangers) 
are distinguished from other homicides. 
Bowers and Pierce also present data that suggest that a considerable amount of caprice is 
part of the death sentencing process. In Florida and Georgia, for example, the probability of a 
death sentence is significantly related to the region in which the homicide is tried, id. at 616-25, 
and the likelihood that particular aggravating circumstances will be found appears to depend 
more on the aggravation necessary to justify a death sentence than on the facts of each case, id. 
at 625-29. For an estimation of the degree of arbitrariness in death sentencing under Califor-
nia's pre-Furman statute, see Baldus, Pulaski, Woodworth & Kyle, Ident!f.ying Comparatively 
Excessive Sentences of .Death: A Quantitative Approach, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1980). 
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deserts, however biased the sample executed, than, that none do. 6 
For some opponents of capital punishment the inconsistency with 
which it is applied is enough to condemn it.7 These opponents need 
not confront the question of whether it is ultimately just to execute 
the murderer, for regardless of ultimate deserts, extreme penalties 
cannot be allowed so long as aspects of personal disadvantage play 
an important part in determining who from among an equally culpa-
ble lot will be subject to the extreme sanction. 
The argument concerning deterrence is of a different kind. If ex-
ecutions deter, it means that killing some who have behaved hei-
nously will prevent the untimely death of blameless others. Indeed, 
those who support capital punishment because of its deterrent effects 
expect that one execution will save several lives, thus avoiding the 
nice philosophical question of whether an innocent life is worth 
more than a guilty one. Many opponents of the death penalty im-
plicitly concede that capital punishment is morally permissible if it 
saves more lives than it takes. 8 The argument is over the empirical 
question of whether the death penalty actually deters and, if so, in 
what circumstances and to what extent. 
There is no necessary connection between moral positions on the 
justice of capital punishment and empirical judgments as to whether 
executions deter, but, not surprisingly, moral opponents find comfort 
in evidence that executions do not deter while moral supporters are 
heartened by those studies that suggest they do. It is difficult for 
those whose essential case against the death penalty rests on the 
value of life to maintain their positions if an execution in fact trades 
one guilty life for several innocent ones.9 Even the argument from 
equality is clouded if the execution of each killer, however inequita-
bly each is selected from among a larger number, prevents the death 
of several innocent people. Since the same features of social class 
which make one peculiarly eligible for capital punishment make one 
disproportionately likely to be a homicide victim, there may even be 
6. van den Haag, supra note 1, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. at 53-56. 
7. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 4. This view also influenced several of the concurring 
Justices in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
8. One wonders if the concession would be forthcoming if the opponents were not con-
vinced that the evidence shows capital punishment does not deter. 
9. For an intriguing argument that this trade-off does not justify capital punishment as a 
matter of human values because the life to be lost is known and the lives to be saved unknown, 
see McKee & Sesnowitz, We!fare Economics Aspects of Capital Punishment, 35 AM. J. EcoN. & 
Soc. 40 (1976). See also Donnelly,A Theory of Justice, Judicial Methodology, and the Constitu-
tionality of Capital Punishment: Rawls, .Dworkin, and a Theory of Criminal Responsibility, 29 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1109, 1145-52 (1978). 
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a kind of rough justice within classes if executions deter. 10 
Although retributivists trace their heritage to Kant and before 
him to the Bible, utilitarianism is pervasive enough in modem 
thought that most retributivists would be troubled if a plausible case 
could not be made for deterrence. Death by execution is both brutal 
and :final.11 It is hard to make the case for such a penalty when the 
only end promoted is the unprovable intuition that it is just. 12 Nev-
ertheless, modem retributivists have been less concerned than their 
opponents with the evidence bearing on deterrence. This may in 
part be because until recently there was virtually no empirical evi-
dence that gave them comfort. Indeed, a desire to justify capital 
punishment on grounds other than deterrence has probably contrib-
uted to the revival of retributivist theories of punishment. The re-
tributivist justification is possible - although nondeterrence be 
proven - because justice, however intuitive its grounding, is itself a 
valued end. Thus, the argument from justice does not necessarily 
take us beyond the question of whether an offender deserves execu-
tion. The opposing moral claim, from the value of life, pulls us al-
most irresistibly to the question of whether taking an offender's life 
will be compensated by the preservation of lives that would other-
wise be lost to murder - the empirical question addressed by the 
research on deterrence. 
IO. This conclusion assumes a general deterrent effect not closely tied to the characteristics 
of those crimes that result in executions. When a lower-class offender is executed for killing an 
upper-class victim, members of the lower class may receive few benefits from deterrence if the 
message conveyed is not "it is wrong to kill," but is instead "it is wrong to kill above your 
class." 
11. Descriptions of executions bring home the point. Camus' well-known Reflections on the 
Guillotine, in REsISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 173, 182-85 (J. O'Brien trans. 1961), cap-
tures both the horror and the brutality of the event. But even ordinary descriptions ofordinary 
executions convey a special sense of horror. West, for example, describing how he came to 
oppose capital punishment, writes: 
In one hour on August 4, 1952, at the Fort Madison, Iowa, State Penitentiary, I learned 
that a chronic schizophrenic man can be found legally sane and thus qualify for hangini; 
that those who came to watch are likely to have a strange and an unhealthy glitter in their 
eyes; that a man hits the end of a rope with a terrible crack; that he doesn't just dangle but 
is likely to writhe for some time; and that the heart stops reluctantly, as the doctors must 
discover, listening with stethoscopes all the while. As I listened (for an interminable 13 
minutes) to the dying heart of Edward J. Beckwith, there was time for me to ask myself a 
host of troublesome questions about what we had done that morning. 
West, Psychiatric Reflections on the .Death Penalty, in CAPITAL PuNISHMENT lN THE UNITED 
.STATES, supra note 5, at 419,420. 
12. Indeed, one often encounters the idea that executions should be made as painless and 
as dignified as possible. Lehtinen, for example, suggests that the executed be administered a 
lethal dose of a sedative in a hospital and his organs made available for transplant. Lehtinen, 
The Value of Lffe: An Argument far the .Death Penalty, 23 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 237, 246 
(1977). 
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I. PROBLEMS WITH RETRIBUTIVISM 
A. Inferring Policy from Philosophy 
1181 
Despite my willingness to concede for the sake of argument that 
justice - by which I mean giving a person his just deserts - may be 
a value superior to life, I believe that the retributivist attempt to es-
cape the deterrence question is inadequate, and that ultimately the 
moral decision on the death penalty must reflect an empirical assess-
ment. The most powerful retributivist arguments for the death pen-
alty fail as a moral justification for capital punishment because they 
do not address the crucial question. Retributivists have let their 
agenda be set by those who defend life as an ultimate value. Thus, 
they direct most of their attention to the question of whether mur-
derers deserve to die. While an affirmative answer to this question is 
necessary to justify capital punishment, it is not sufficient. There re-
mains the rather different question of whether the state should be 
allowed to execute murderers. 
A state-run system of executions poses problems for retributivists 
which are not posed by the mere taking of guilty lives. We can per-
haps best appreciate this at an intuitive level. It is easy to imagine a 
person who is not troubled by news that an escaping murderer has 
been shot and yet quite disturbed by the news that a murderer is 
about to be executed. In Chicago, for example, between the years 
1934 and 1954 eight times as many criminals were killed by police or 
private individuals as were executed in the Cook County Jail. 13 The 
executions, no doubt, caused far more controversy and grief than did 
the other killings, even though many of the latter must have involved 
crimes for which the death penalty could not have been given. In 
part this is because the scheduling of executions allows those who 
value even guilty lives to become involved in efforts to save them, 
but this cannot be the whole story. If lives were the only issue, more 
effort would be directed toward preventing police and shop owners 
from shooting fleeing felons than toward the abolition of capital 
punishment. Another reason why state executions excite feelings 
that are not excited when the sole issue is whether a slain murderer 
has received his just deserts is that our doubts about the justness of 
the desert we mete out increase when the state does the killing. We 
can explain the deadly reaction of a store owner or police officer to a 
perceived threat as a normal human response to pressure, but be-
cause the state has time for considered action, we hold it to special 
standards of rationality. 
13. T. SELLIN, THE DEATH PENALTY 62 (1959). 
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Once we acknowledge that not everyone who kills another 
should die - and virtually all modem retributivists acknowledge 
this - doubts about the fairness of the process by which we select 
those we execute arise. I have already mentioned the difficulties 
some see in justifying executions when the poor or the black are 
over-selected for the ultimate punishment, but even less invidious 
inconsistencies must trouble the retributivist. For absent some self-
evident principle separating murderers who deserve to die from 
those who do not, a principled basis for retributivism may only be 
determined inductively. If inconsistent sentencing prevents the deri-
vation of a socially validated principle, the person who applauds the 
execution of the murderer is applauding what is literally unprinci-
pled state action. While unprincipled state action may be more com-
mon than most of us would like, we usually try to avoid theories 
which, when applied, lead us to applaud it. 
If there is solace for the retributivist, it is in his sense that the 
state's lack of principle leads it to spare life rather than to take it. 
People who deserve to die but are spared death can hardly prick 
one's conscience. While this view may satisfy some moralists who 
would otherwise have qualms about espousing an inevitably capri-
cious system of capital punishment, it offers nothing to the skeptic. 
When one criminal is executed and another of apparently equal cul-
pability spared, there is no self-evident reason why the sparing and 
not the execution is wrong. When a state cannot act consistently in 
such an important matter as determining who shall die, those who 
invoke moral philosophy to demand that the state be allowed to 
make that determination should be able to point to a consensually 
validated principle which assures us that the inconsistency is be-
nign.14 
Retributivism is also haunted by those executions of the innocent 
which inevitably occur if the death penalty is allowed. It is true that 
documented cases in which the wrong person is executed are quite 
rare, 15 and likely to remain so. But, as a purely philosophical matter, 
this is of little help to the retributivist. Retributivism, on its own 
terms, allows life to be taken only when death is deserved; it does not 
tolerate killing as a means to some greater social good. Retribu-
14. Retributivists can escape the dilemma, and some do, by claiming that their purpose is 
limited to determining the characteristics of a just system of punishment in a just world. How-
ever, if the limitation is meant seriously, we know from the research of economists on the 
theory of the second best that a system which maximizes justice in an ideal world is not 
necessarily the most just system in an imperfect society. 
15. See, e.g., Pollak, The Ellors of Justice, in CAPITAL PuN1sHMENT 207 (T. Sellin ed. 
1967). 
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tivists are proud of their Kantian heritage, which demands that life 
be treated only as an end. Thus, however good a just punishment 
system and however much such a system demands the death penalty, 
the philosophy of retributivism apparently forbids the sacrifice of in-
nocent lives as a condition for the maintenance of such a system. 
Ideally, of course, a system of capital punishment would not take 
innocent lives, but we know as a statistical matter that if a state exe-
cutes often enough, some innocent lives will be lost. Although it 
may be a comfort not knowing what lives will be mistakenly taken, 
nothing about retributivism allows us to sacrifice the lives of un-
known innocents in the interest of just vengeance. 16 
As I have noted, few modern retributivists believe that all killers 
deserve death. They respect the law's determination that capital 
punishment should be reserved for the most morally culpable: those 
who fully intended, and perhaps rejoiced in, the suffering and death 
they inflicted and who, in some meaningful sense, could have done 
otherwise. Moral culpability, thus conceived, is a subjective state. 
To truly determine who are the most evil and thus the most deserv-
ing of death one would have to search people's minds. Our inability 
to do so means that in deciding whether to inflict the death penalty 
we often attend more to the circumstances of the crime than to the 
circumstances of the criminal. The person who slays in a peculiar or 
brutal way is more likely to receive the death penalty than one who 
dispatches his victim with a single bullet, yet the former may have 
been insane under all but the narrowest legal test while the latter was 
cool and calculating. 
Indeed, the former may have been insane even under any legal 
test. While the mistaken conviction of those who have not,killed is 
certainly rare, the mistaken allocation of responsibility to those who 
16. Absent the death penalty there would still be substantial retributivism and thus justice 
in the form of sentences to life imprisonment. A number of innocent people will necessarily 
receive such sentences since mistakes are an inevitable part of any punishment system. The 
marginal loss of retributively defined justice in the case of the guilty will be the difference 
between the retributivism inherent in the life sentence and that inherent in an execution, but 
the marginal gain in justice accorded the innocent will be greater. A number of the innocent 
will prove their blamelessness after conviction, be released early from prison, and in all 
probability be compensated to some extent for the time they have served. Note that the pres-
ence of the death penalty may also contribute to the unjustified infliction of less than death 
sentences on the innocent. A guilty plea by an innocent accused may be more likely in a death 
penalty jurisdiction than in a jurisdiction where one does not risk death by asserting his inno-
cence, and a jury qualified to impose the death penalty may be more likely mistakenly to 
convict of a less than capital offense than one which has not been so qualified. Haney, Juries 
and the .Death Penalty: Readdressing the Witherspoon Question, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
512 (1980); Jurow, New .Data on the Effect oJ a ".Death Qua/flied" Jury on the Guilt .Determina-
tion Process, 84 HAR.v. L. REv. 567 (1971). For an extended discussion of the relevance of the 
fact that we do not know who is being executed wrongfully, see the appendix to this Article. 
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have killed may be uncomfortably common. To the retributivist one 
mistake is almost as bad as another, for in most retributivist schemes 
the unpremeditated murderer or the insane killer no more deserves 
to die than the innocent victim of a misidentification.17 In arguing 
from a retributivist philosophy to an actual system of state execu-
tions, retributivists are again advocating a system that will work sub-
stantial injustice as measured by the standards of the philosophical 
system they espouse. 
The time lag between the time of the crime and the time of exe-
cution also poses problems for retributivism. Executions are justified 
only when the offender deserves to die. Assuming that all those sen-
tenced to death deserved to die at the time they committed the 
crimes for which they were sentenced, it does not follow that they 
deserve death at the time it arrives. People so change with their ex-
periences that one may sensibly conceive of individuals as different 
people deserving different fates at different points in time. 18 Being 
on death row may be an experience that is especially likely to pro-
mote such a change in moral identity.19 
In short, there is a fundamental irony to the usual retributivist 
position. Basic principles of moral justice that are believed to justify 
or even demand the death of those who maliciously kill others are 
necessarily offended by the attempt to impose a system of state ex-
ecutions in an imperfect world. The emphasis that retributivists 
place on human beings as ends and not as means, the high value 
they place on innocent human life, and their insistence that retributi-
vism (unlike revenge) respects the bounds oflaw combine to form a 
philosophy from which one cannot derive a policy that trades the 
wrongful execution of a few for the proper execution of many.20 
Capital punishment implements such a policy. Conversely, any pol-
icy derived from a philosophy that is rooted in our intuitions regard-
ing justice will be suspect if the system it prescribes distributes 
17. Obviously one could construct a retributivist scheme in which all but accidental death 
was regarded as sufficiently heinous to merit capital punishment. Most retributivists have not 
done so, believing that the death sentence should be reserved for killings that the law classifies 
as first degree murder or for a particularly offensive subset of such killings. 
18. A similar point has been made by Donald Regan in an article seeking justifications for 
paternalism. Regan, Just!ftcationsfor Paternalism, in THE LIMITS OF LAW 189 (NOMOS XV, 
J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1974). 
19. For an example, see Bailey, Rehabilitation on .Death Row, in THE DEATH PENALTY IN 
AMERICA, supra note 1. 
20. Judging by the reactions of those who have read this Article in draft, this is the most 
controversial statement in this section of the paper. For those who do not accept my conclu-
sion or are otherwise interested in the philosophic questions it raises, I offer a detailed analysis 
of this question. For those who agree with me or are not interested in pursuing the matter in 
detail, I offer it in an appendix. 
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rewards or punishments in an invidious or inconsistent fashion. 
Capital punishment is such a system. 
B. Implications of The Wish for Revenge 
The preceding discussion focuses on the logic of deriving a sys-
tem of capital punishment from the premises of retributivism. As 
such, it speaks to the scholarly debate but does not address the more 
primitive appeal of retributivism. When one person wantonly kills 
another we are - if our senses have not been jaded by murder after 
murder - outraged. Retribution in the form of killing the offender 
seems like an honorable thing to do. 
Why do we feel there is honor in repaying death with death? I 
believe the reasons are largely cultural. Once we understand them 
we will see how it is possible - injustices aside - to be attracted by 
retributlvism while simultaneously opposing capital punishment. 
Both our history and fiction are replete with characters and com-
munities that are thought to have acted admirably in securing the 
death of grievous off enders. But it is not the fact of vengeful killing 
that we admire. Rather, it is the process by which retribution is 
achieved. We honor individuals not because they redress some cos-
mic balance sheet, but because they risk their lives for an idea of 
justice. The Arthurian epic nicely highlights the way in which the 
degree of honor depends on the element of personal risk. The legend 
is also interesting for its message that the honor sought by the aveng-
ing champion is secondary to that which may be found in search of 
the holy. 
In the case of communities the infliction of death has, histori-
cally, a different meaning. The pursuit and execution of criminals 
were cooperative endeavors that brought communities together to re-
affirm their central values.21 It is not the fact that a death was repaid 
with a death which is salutary; rather, it is the process necessary to 
bring this about. Just as the linkage of a positive reinforcer with a 
neutral stimulus will give the stimulus a positive quality, so do the 
efforts associated with past accounts of retribution give retributivism 
its lingering good name.22 But once the state assumes the burden of 
executing, the character of the retributive process is fundamentally 
21. Obviously, this is not always the case, and we do not find communal retribution partic-
ularly admirable when it is not. See K. ERICKSON, WAYWARD PuRITANS (1966). 
22. For a long while many people thought that retributivism's name was all bad. However, 
the response to the efforts of the modem retributivists make it clear that, as a society, even the 
intellectuals among us acknowledge a positive side to retributivism. Cf. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (noting various writers' acceptance of retributivism). 
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changed. There is no honor in watching the state execute one who in 
the past would have been a just target of the watcher's vengeance, 
nor does honor attach to the person who sets a noose or straps a 
convict into a chair. The meaning of executions has also changed 
considerably for communities. Specialized law enforcement means 
that citizens no longer have to come together to secure retribution, 
and the execution itself has become a source of passionate contro-
versy rather than the occasion for a reassertion of communal solidar-
ity. 
In his book For Capital Punishment, Walter Berns uses the exam-
ple of Shakespeare's Macbeth to make a strong intuitive case that 
some people's crimes are such that they must die.23 One may agree 
with Berns that there is justice, both poetic and otherwise, in Mac-
beth's paying with his life for his crimes. But Berns's desired conclu-
sion, that a system of state executions is appropriate and satisfying, 
does not follow. 
Consider an alternative ending to Shakespeare's play. Macduff, 
instead of taking the field against Macbeth, calls the police to report 
Macbeth's murders. Macbeth is arrested and tried. He rejects a plea 
bargain that would have spared his life, and the case proceeds to 
trial. During the course of the lengthy trial the mass of people who 
hated Macbeth for his action begin to understand the character that 
led him to so act. He is no longer just the killer of Duncan and 
others, but is again, in almost impossible juxtaposition, one of Scot-
land's noblest Lords, himself deserving to be king. The people learn 
of Macbeth's instinctive revulsion at the idea of turning on his guest 
and king, they hear of Lady Macbeth's constant prodding, and they 
realize that Macbeth's will was inexplicably overborne. Finally, they 
sense that Macbeth's remorse is genuine and that he fully accepts the 
values his actions threatened. Nevertheless, the jury convicts and the 
judge, who is up for reelection that year, sentences Macbeth to die. 
A Gallup poll indicates that 44% of the people surveyed believe the 
sentence is just, 39% believe Macbeth should be spared, and 17% 
have no opinion. Immediately a committee to save Macbeth is 
formed. The next two years are taken up with judicial appeals -
often on technical matters that have no relation to the core moral 
issues - and with pleas for executive clemency. From time to time a 
story appears in the paper emphasizing that whatever Macbeth was, 
he is today a decent man. Eventually the last appeal is dismissed 
and the king, after dropping hints that he might spare Macbeth, de-
23. W. BERNS, supra note I, at 167. 
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cides it would be politically inexpedient to do so. On a cold Novem-
ber morning, with fifty members of the Spare Macbeth Committee 
marching outside the prison walls in protest, a warden, a minister, a 
doctor, an executioner, and two reporters watch Macbeth dangle on 
the end of a rope for twenty-five minutes until he chokes to death. 
The reporters note in the evening papers that ''the drop was not han-
dled well," but they do not mention the urination and defecation 
that took place while Macbeth was dangling. Television news uses 
the occasion to review the story of the assassination and to interview 
tearful members of Macbeth's family who, in their grief, accuse the 
state of murder.24 
Our satisfaction with Macduff's slaying of Macbeth, which Berns 
plays on so effectively, reflects not the fact of retribution but the way 
it was accomplished. Had an impersonal, divisive, state-controlled 
execution like that described above been the only way of dispatching 
Macbeth, the play, no doubt, would not have been written. Yet in 
contemporary society, with the importance we attach to personal 
freedom, trial justice, and the safeguarding of the innocent, this is 
the only way that the state may act retributively. There is nothing 
noble about it. As with the basic philosophical argument, the exis-
tence, and to that extent the self-evident validity, of the retributivist 
intuition that certain killers ought to be repaid with death tells us 
only that there is some good in killing evildoers. However, if we 
understand the intuition's cultural roots, we see that it does not fol-
low that there ought to be a state system of capital punishment. The 
retributivist instinctively applauds Macduff because he bravely 
killed a man who deserved to die.25 State executions not only de-
stroy our consensus as to what fate is deserved, but they also elimi-
nate the possibility of honor. Our instinct for revenge - and that is 
what the retributivist intuition is at base - was shaped by and is 
meant for a different world. 
II. THE DETERRENCE .ARGUMENT 
The argument from deterrence does not share the deficiencies of 
the retributivist position. Its central premise - that executing mur-
derers will save more lives than are taken - provides a reasonable 
24. An alternative scenario would have Macbeth denying hili complicity in the crime and 
blaming it all on the guards. While there might be enough evidence to convict Macbeth, we 
could never know as much as Shakespeare tells us. To this day people would be writing books 
protesting Macbeth's innocence. Many might believe them, and no one could know for sure 
that they were wrong. 
25. The criminal law does not, however, applaud such action. Macduff would today be 
guilty of premeditated murder, and in some jurisdictions could be sentenced to death. 
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moral basis for a system of state executions.26 The inevitable biased, 
mistaken, or inconsistent applications of the death penalty that make 
retributivism a philosophy fit only for an ideal world pose no special 
problems for the argument from deterrence. Such mistakes, al-
though regrettable, do not contradict the basic premises of the argu-
ment. So long as the system of capital punishment saves more lives 
than are lost there is virtue in maintaining the system. 
Indeed, the argument from deterrence can justify the execution 
of the innocent, for even a mistaken execution might prevent more 
than one murder.27 This possibility has been taken by some as a 
ground for denying deterrence any place in the moral debate on cap-
ital punishment. But to so reject deterrence misses the crucial point, 
which is that deterrence as a moral justification for capital punish-
ment is a necessary but not sufficient condition. The virtue of the net 
saving of human life that deterrence promises may be outweighed by 
the injustice of inconsistent or error-prone systems of capital punish-
ment. 28 
If the moral case for capital punishment turns for many people 
on its deterrent effects, it is because for those people the injustices 
inherent in a system of capital punishment are tolerable if state ex-
ecutions generate a net saving of human life.29 Whether capital pun-
ishment saves lives by preventing homicide is an empirical question. 
Thus the moral argument from deterrence turns on an assessment of 
. the social effects of capital punishment in a way that the moral argu-
ment from retributivism does not. Because the moral argument from 
deterrence turns on an empirical question, we shall tum shortly to an 
evaluation of the empirical evidence. Before we do, however, two 
matters should be clarified. The first involves a matter of definition 
and the second a question of perspective. 
26. One can combine the deterrence and desert arguments, and might have to if several 
murderers had to be executed to deter one homicide. As presented, it is usually assumed that 
one execution will deter several homicides, and it is the argument in this form that will be 
examined most closely. 
27. It is not necessarily the case that an execution is justified within the premises of deter-
rence theory whenever more than one murder is thereby deterred. It may be that we should 
value the known life of the condemned higher than the unknown lives which will be preserved 
at some future time. See McKee & Sesnowitz, supra note 9. 
28. See, e.g., Schedler, Capital Punishment and Its .Deterrent Effect, 4 Soc. THEORY & 
PRAc. 47-56 (1976); Lyons, .Detellence Theory and Punishment of the Innocent, 84 ETHICS 346 
(1974); Margolis, Capital Punishment, 2 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 269 (1977); Wertheimer, .Deter-
rence and Retribution, 86 ETHICS 181 (1976). 
29. See, e.g., Goldberg, On Capital Punishment, 85 ETHICS 67 (1974); van den Haag, supra 
note 1, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. at 51; van den Haag, On .Deterrence and the .Death Penalty, 18 
ETHICS 280 (1968). 
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A. Preventive Effects 
Up to this point I have referred to the process by which capital 
punishment saves lives as "deterrence." But deterrence, which exists 
when one refrains from criminal action because he fears punishment, 
is only one of many ways that punishment can inhibit crime.30 
Gibbs, for example, points to seven ways other than deterrence in 
which punishment can prevent crime. He believes that two of these, 
incapacitation (the fact that those executed cannot slay again) and 
normative validation (the process by which punishment impresses 
the upright and the undecided with the moral validity of the norm 
proscribing homicide), might explain any significant tendency for re-
gimes of capital punishment to lower homicide rates.31 
Gibbs's suggestion that incapacitation might explain apparent 
deterrent effects of the death penalty is probably mistaken, for a sub-
stantial degree of incapacitation is built into· the lengthy prison 
sentences that murderers receive in the absence of a death penalty. 
Research suggests that murderers rarely kill in prison and are un-
likely to engage in violent crime if they are paroled. Giardini and 
Farrow, looking at 197 capital offenders in twenty-two states who 
had been on parole for periods ranging from one to thirty-eight 
years, report that only eleven violated parole by committing new of-
fenses, and that none committed a homicide.32 In an editorial post-
script to Giardini and Farrow, Sellin notes that as of 1956 only one 
of 342 male prisoners paroled in California from first-degree murder 
convictions between 1945 and 1954 had been returned to prison after 
being convicted of murder. He also reports that none of sixty-three 
first-degree murderers paroled in New York between the years 1930 
and 1961 and none of 273 first-degree murderers paroled in Ohio 
between 1945 and 1965 was returned to prison for committing a 
homicide.33 Jayewardene, extrapolating from Finnish data, esti-
mates that had Canada spared the seventy-two murderers it executed 
between 1950 and 1964, and instead released them immediately upon 
conviction, there would have been two additional homicides during 
that fifteen-year period. If Canada had executed every one of its 262 
capital murderers during those years, six lives is the most that might 
30. See Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects ef Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 949 
(1966). 
31. See Gibbs, supra note 3. 
32. Giardini & Farrow, The Paroling ef Capital Offenders, in CAPITAL PuNISHMENT, supra 
note 15, at 169. 
33. Id. at 185-86. 
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have been saved.34 
The preventive effects of normative validation may be more sub-
stantial. Supporters of capital punishment are fond of quoting Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, who wrote: 
Some men probably abstain from murder because they fear that if they 
committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of thousands ab-
stain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why 
they regard it with horror is that murderers are hanged. 35 
The argument is reasonable. It-may be that the main benefit of capi-
tal punishment is that it teaches people that it is wrong to kill. But 
the opposite position is also reasonable. It may be that capital pun-
ishment teaches people that life is not sacred and that killing is not 
always a moral wrong.36 
When I speak of the deterrent effect of capital punishment in my 
review of the empirical literature, I will generally be using the term 
as a shorthand reference for all the preventive effects associated with 
a system of capital punishment. Data relating to capital punishment 
have never been analyzed with an eye to separating deterrent from 
normative validation effects, although the distinction might have im-
portant policy implications. If capital punishment reduces homi-
cides predominently through deterrence, frequent executions might 
be justified. If the reduction occurs primarily through normative 
validation, an occasional execution every few years might prevent as 
many deaths as a larger number.37 
34. C. JAYEWARDENE, THE PENALTY OF DEATH (1977). There are problems with 
Jayewardene's figures apart from the problems inherent in any extrapolation. The prediction 
that substituting parole for 72 executions would mean only two deaths is based on homicide 
rates where parole follows lengthy imprisonment. Paroling instead of executing might lead to 
more homicides not only because of decreased incapacitation but also because of decreased 
deterrence as well as the release of people at more violence-prone ages. On the other hand, it 
is important to recognize that the case for preventing homicide by executing all first-degree 
murderers might, consideration of desert aside, apply to all violent criminals. It is plausible 
that the murder rate among those who have committed other violent crimes is at least as high, 
after controlling for age at release, as the rate for former murderers. Finally, if the 262 mur-
derers who were not executed were also not paroled, it is unlikely that they would commit 
murders at the rate of paroled offenders, and so the decision not to execute would not cost as 
much as six lives. 
35. J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND (1883), quoted in E. VAN 
DEN HAAG, supra note 1, PUNISHING CRIMINALS at 68-69. 
36. q: Sykes & Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 AM, 
Soc. R.E.v. 664 (1957) (juvenile delinquents learn to neutralize portions of dominant norms and 
values, thus making their actions not seem morally wrong to them). See also the discussion of 
Bowers and Pierce's research in text at notes 121-29 infra. 
37. If this is true, we should be able empirically to separate effects of normative validation 
from those of deterrence by determining whether single executions are more important than 
execution rates in explaining homicide. However, it is also possible that people's subjective 
fear of being executed for murder rises sharply with the first execution in a jurisdiction within 
a given time period and rather less sharply thereafter. 
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The potential impact of normative validation also confounds the 
search for deterrence because while it is unlikely that an execution in 
a capital punishment state will have a deterrent effect in a neighbor-
ing abolitionist state,38 it is plausible that its normative validation 
effects will extend beyond state borders. We should not, however, 
make too much of this point. Normative validation through exem-
plary punishment has never actually been shown to exist, and mur-
der, particularly the kind of murder that results in the death penalty, 
is so generally disapproved of at all levels of society that there is little 
a priori reason to believe that the death penalty must be substituted 
for life imprisonment to drive home the message that murder is 
wrong. 
B. A Common Sense Perspective 
Few people approach the data relating capital punishment to de-
terrence without some expectation of what they will find. Often their 
reaction to the data appears more reflective of their initial orienta-
tion than of the information presented. In principle, there is nothing 
wrong with this. If one has a well-grounded theory suggesting a par-
ticular relationship, one should be more skeptical of data rejecting 
that relationship than of data supporting it.39 Preconceptions or, to 
give them a better sounding name, theoretical orientations, are also 
helpful in that they alert us to aspects of problems that particular 
data cannot illuminate. The dangers of strong theoretical orienta-
tions are that they may lead people obstinately to disregard the 
strength of conflicting evidence, and they may lead empirical re-
searchers to choose tests or stopping points that do not give evidence 
counter to favored hypotheses a fair chance to appear. Such pos-
sibilities may be better evaluated if theoretical starting points are dis-
closed. I shall therefore sketch the preliminary orientation to the 
data that appears most reasonable to me. The reader may compare 
his preliminary orientation with mine, and may decide after reading 
my analysis of the evidence whether I have been misled by the views 
I begin with. 
Instinctively, one would expect the death penalty to deter. Most 
of us are sufficiently afraid of dying that we would take extreme ac-
tion to avoid a clear threat of death, and most of us remember occa-
38. It is not impossible for it to have such an effect because deterrence is a subjective and 
not an objective state. A potential killer might confuse another state's punishment system with 
that of his own, and the publicity given to an execution may emphasize for some the 
probability of getting caught, another outcome important to deterrence. 
39. The orientation to statistics implicit here is commonly called Bayesian. 
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sions when the fear of punishment caused us to refrain from taking 
actions we deeply desired. However, our instincts regarding deter-
rence, like our retributive instincts, are insufficiently attentive to the 
system in which capital punishment is embedded. They hold no nec-
essary implications for the expected deterrent efficacy of capital pun-
ishment. 
The most important attribute of the system of capital punishment 
is the presence of life imprisonment as an alternative. This means 
that it is only the marginal deterrent effect of capital punishment that 
is important. The issue is not whether we slay murderers or free 
them; it is whether we send them to their death or to prison for life.40 
It is difficult to select from the array of activities which a death threat 
might induce us to drop any which we would engage in if the threat 
were instead that we would only be imprisoned for life. Of course to 
deny any marginal deterrent effect to the death penalty is not to deny 
the possibility that punishment deters, nor is it to deny the plausibil-
ity of a theory that postulates, within certain limits, an association 
between the severity of threatened punishment and the degree of de-
terrent effect. Thus, the plausibility of deterrence theory and the evi-
dence that supports it does not necessarily imply a .deterrent effect of 
capital punishment.41 
The second aspect of capital punishment that suggests a minimal 
deterrent effect is the relative infrequency with which the death pen-
alty is imposed.42 Rarely has a state executed a substantial percent-
40. To the extent people perceived convicted murderers as commonly serving terms of less 
than life at the time the data I shall review were collected, one might expect more of a margi-
nal deterrent effect to capital punishment than where life imprisonment was regarded as the 
likely alternative. This would render equivocal the message conveyed by studies showing a 
deterrent effect of capital punishment, for it is possible that deterrent effects would have been 
the same had those executed been sent to prison for life. It is also the case that some convicted 
killers receive sentences of less than life imprisonment and many if not most serve less than a 
life term even if so sentenced. It may be that the publicity surrounding death sentences sug-
gests that the overall sanction system for murder is more severe than it in fact is or would seem 
to be if the most serious offenders received and served life terms. This too would lead one to 
expect a deterrent effect to be associated with capital punishment. 
41. Isaac Ehrlich, for example, writes as if this were the case. See, e.g., Ehrlich & Mark, 
Fear of .Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 293 (1977). The point can be illustrated with an exam-
ple involving sentences other than death. A community concerned about overtime parking 
enacts a law providing a mandatory ten-year prison sentence for those who allow their parking 
meters to expire. While a life sentence is clearly more onerous than a ten-year sentence, there 
is little reason to expect it will deter more. If the ten-year sentence does not persuade everyone 
to leave his car at home, it is unlikely that the life sentence will do this. For those who do 
park, it is hard to imagine how they can be any more careful concerning the time remaining on 
their meters than they will be if the penalty for letting the meter expire is ten years. 
42. Conway has suggested that this feature may increase the marginal deterrent effect of 
capital punishment. See Conway, Capital Punishment and .Deterrence: Some Consideration in 
.Dialogue Form, 3 PHILOSOPHY & PuB. A.FF. 431 (1974). He points out that while the certainty 
of capital punishment might not be much more terrifying than the certainty of life imprison-
May 1981) .Desert and .Deterrence 1193 
age of its homicide offenders, and in most states at most times the 
proportion executed has been quite low.43 Low execution rates sug-
gest limited deterrence because, however much people fear death, 
they commonly prefer immediate gratification to a statistically 
higher chance of an unduly early demise. Decisions to smoke and to 
ignore auto seat belts are common examples. Supporters of capital 
punishment might argue that the lesson is that all killers should be 
executed, 44 but in reality we are unlikely ever to execute a large pro-
portion of our homicide offenders.45 The Supreme Court has not 
been reluctant to interfere with state procedures that do not allow 
adequate consideration of mitigating factors,46 and most of the mod-
em retributivists who have made the intellectual case for restoring 
capital punishment believe death is the deserved sanction for only a 
minority of homicides. In any case, whatever the future incidence of 
capital punishment, the studies we shall examine deal with situations 
where death was the penalty for only a small proportion of all mur-
derers. For this reason if no other, we might expect these studies to 
reveal little in the way of a deterrent effect. 
There is a third reason why we should expect little deterrence 
from the death penalty. The threat of death can only deter potential 
criminals who loosely calculate the costs and rewards of their behav-
ior. Many homicides occur when the offender is highly emotional or 
under the influence of alcohol - situations in which rational calcu-
lation appears unlikely. Ironically, the very factors that inhibit ra-
tional calculation affect premeditation, so that homicide when 
rationality is impaired is not likely to be punishable by death.47 To 
ment, a 10% possibility of capital punishment may be much more frightening than a 10% 
chance of life imprisonment. I expect the argument is sound, but it misses a crucial point. 
Unless capital punishment is truly mandatory the perceived probability of the two punish-
ments is unlikely to be equal. The sufficiently contemplative would-be murderer is likely to 
perceive his chance of drawing a life sentence at 40% in an abolitionist jurisdiction and his 
chance of drawing the death penalty at 2% (with a 38% chance of a life sentence) in a reten-
tionist jurisdiction. 
43. Bowers estimates that only about 2% of all homicides before 1950 and fewer than 1% 
after 1950 resulted in executions. w. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 24 (1974). This re-
flects, in part, the facts that not all killers are caught and not all homicides are capital. If, as 
some evidence suggests, between 15 and 25% of all pre-1960 homicides were in principle capi-
tal, executions have been the fate of at most IO to 15% of all capital murderers in modem 
times. 
44. Lehtinen, supra note 12. · 
45. See Morris, Hans Mattick and the .Death Penalty: Sentimental Noles on Two Topics, IO 
ToL. L. REv. 299, 311 (1979); Murchison, Toward a Perspective on the .Death Penalty Cases, 21 
EMORY LJ. 469, 552-53 (1978). 
46. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
47. Ideally, the search for deterrence would exclude such homicides or at least treat them 
separately from premeditated murders, but the available data do not allow this. The statistical 
work, therefore, proceeds on the assumption that the proportion of capital to noncapital homi-
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the extent that nonpremeditated murders predominate in homicide 
statistics, we can expect that deterrence will be relatively unimpor-
tant in determining homicide rates. 
The three features that make it unlikely that capital punishment 
deters many homicides should not mitigate the effects of normative 
validation to nearly the same degree. Although a life sentence car-
ries the message that murder is wrong, our willingness to apply the 
death penalty may be peculiarly effective in creating this impression. 
The infrequency of executions may not interfere with the normative 
message conveyed. Indeed, frequent executions might be counter-
productive if normative validation is the goal, for at some point even 
a justified bloodbath might cheapen human life. Finally, while the 
likelihood of calculating pleasure and pain may diminish with alco-
hol or passion, one beyond reflection may still retain a sense of right 
and wrong and be influenced by it. Thus, those features of capital 
punishment which make us skeptical about whether it can be ex-
pected to deter should not make us doubt the possibility of norma-
tive validation. If we do not expect to find evidence of normative 
validation in the data, it is because we do not expect state executions 
to convey a sense of the sacredness of life or because we believe that 
message is so fully conveyed by other social institutions that those 
who have not learned to respect life in other settings are unlikely to 
learn this lesson from an occasional death sentence. To my mind 
these latter expectations are at least as plausible as the expectation of 
a normative validation effect. 
The discussion of why we should not ordinarily expect capital 
punishment to be a substantial deterrent also suggests situations 
where a deterrent effect is plausible. Capital punishment might, for 
example, be expected to deter homicides by those serving life 
sentences and by those who have committed but have not yet been 
arrested for crimes punishable by life imprisonment, particularly 
cides is relatively stable across states and over time. To the extent it is not, actual deterrent 
effects could be either hidden or unduly emphasized in the data we shall examine. In recent 
years there has been a dramatic rise in the ratio of stranger to family-friend murders. Since 
family murders are usually crimes of passion punished as second-degree murder or man-
slaughter, while stranger murders are more often first-degree murders, it might appear that this 
means there has been an increase in more deterrable kinds of homicides. This is not necessar-
ily the case. Strangers murders in recent years are more often committed by juveniles who 
may be less responsive than adults to threats qf future harm and who may know that as a 
matter oflaw or policy they are unlikely to receive the death penalty. Also, there has been an 
increase in felony murders. While these are typically capital, many are premeditated in only a 
constructive sense. If, for example, a gunman in the course of a robbery shoots a bullet into 
the ceiling to scare the victim and a piece of plaster falls killing him, it may be considered a 
felony murder. The data in the studies we shall discuss pertain generally to periods before 
these trends were well established, whatever their implications. 
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crimes such as kidnapping which allow time for rational reflection 
on the threat posed by witnesses. In these situations the marginal 
threat may loom large48 and we might reasonably predict that the 
rate of homicides by life offenders is lower in death penalty than in 
abolitionist states. The question of whether we :find this pattern is 
like the question of whether we fail to :find those deterrent effects 
whose implausibility I have suggested in that it is a subject for em-
pirical inquiry. Whatever our preconceptions, we should be open to 
the data. 
Other kinds of homicides that one might think particularly likely 
to be deterrable by the threat of capital punishment are murders of 
police and prison guards, contract killings, and murders by terrorists. 
The murder of police and prison guards appears more amenable to 
deterrence than ordinary murder because potential killers might an-
ticipate a higher than average probability of the death penalty for 
such slayings and so our second reason for being skeptical of the 
deterrent efficacy of the death penalty does not apply. However, at 
least in the case of police murders, the incentive to kill to avoid all 
punishment may be so strong as to overwhelm all deterrent effects. 
Contract killings appear a good bet for deterrence because the 
rationality of the decision to kill means that our third reason for be-
ing skeptical of deterrence does not apply. Here, however, our in-
stincts probably betray us because contract killers are apparently like 
most professionals in that they are specially skilled. Hence, they are 
rarely caught. Conceivably the presence of capital punishment 
could raise the market price of contract killings, and thereby save a 
few lives by reducing the demand for the services of professional 
killers. The number of lives saved would be a function of the elastic-
ity of that demand. One would expect that number to be small, for 
those who dislike other persons intensely enough or who are other-
wise so interested in their death as to hire a killer are unlikely to be 
dissuaded by small increases in price. 
With respect to homicides by terrorists, Andenaes has convinc-
ingly argued that when a revolution is about to succeed or an in-
vader about to be expelled, capital punishment is a substantially 
48. What is crucial is the perception of the offender. The person under life sentence may 
perceive a killing as destroying all hope for parole, while the kidnapper may believe a life 
sentence is not likely unless he kills. Thus, deterrence theory warns us that in the absence of 
capital punishment stringent sentences or high mandatory punishments may have serious 
criminogenic effects.in a small number of cases. The lesson may, however, be to change the 
sentence structure rather than to institute the death penalty. There may well be ways to make 
life sentences more onerous for those who kill while serving or facing life sentences. If so, the 
death penalty might again be relatively unimportant at the margin. 
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more effective deterrent than a life sentence because no offender ex-
pects a life sentence to last more than a few months.49 However, this 
is not the situation in the United States today and few potential kill-
ers are likely to be so deluded as to think so. Thus, we should not 
expect to find this possibility of deterrence reflected in the data col-
lected by those whose work we shall review. 
Capital punishment might also prevent homicide if holding 
"political prisoners" stimulates terrorist assaults to free them. 
Strictly speaking, this is not a deterrent effect, but rather the removal 
by execution of an incentive to crime. If the United States ever had 
to deal with homicidal terrorists it might for this reason decide to 
execute those it captured. Here, however, the system of punishment 
is again crucial. While killing terrorists immediately would prevent 
attempts to trade their lives for others, according terrorists due pro-
cess of law before their execution would provide ample time for fur-
ther terrorist activity, and impending executions might encourage 
other terrorists to take retaliatory action. As with revolutionary kill-
ing, terrorist activity does not affect the studies we shall examine. 
Finally, there are a number of ways in which we might plausibly 
expect a system of capital punishment to increase the homicide rate. 
The hypothesis that state executions degrade life and thus brutalize 
is intuitively as plausible as the theory of normative validation. 
There have apparently been cases in which people sought execution 
as a means of suicide and so, presumably, would not have killed in a 
state with no death penalty.50 Those who think they are going to be 
executed for a crime may kill more recklessly to avoid capture than 
those who believe that life imprisonment is the maximum punish-
ment. Even killing terrorists without due process may cost more 
lives than it saves, for r~venge may be more likely than attempts to 
take hostages for ransom. 
C. The Empirical Research 
Having defined what we mean by deterrence and sketched the 
outline of a common sense perspective, we shall now examine the 
principal research on deterrence to see if the findings conform with 
these common sense expectations. If they do, we should expect to 
49. Andenaes, supra note 30, at 967-68. 
50. See, e.g., Diamond, Murder and the .Death Penalty: A Case Report, in CAPITAL PUN-
ISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 445; Solomon, Capital Punishment as Suicide 
and as Murder, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 432; West, 
supra note 11, at 426-27. On the general issue of possible brutalization, see Glaser, Capital 
Punishment - .Deterrent or Stimulus to Murder? Our Unexamined .Deaths and Penalties, 10 
TOL. L. REV. 317 (1979). 
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find little evidence that the existence of capital punishmnent deters. 
We shall not, however, be able unequivocally to attribute a failure to 
find deterrence to those reasons which suggest that the death penalty 
has little deterrent impact at the margin. It is possible that the death 
penalty does deter but that its deterrent impact is offset by 
homicidogenic effects. Should the extant research conflict with our 
expectations, we might, depending on the quality and consistency of 
the research results, have to reconsider our position: sufficient data 
of sufficient quality showing a deterrent or nondeterrent effect must 
be respected.51 If findings are mixed, we cannot escape the problem 
of evaluating conflicting evidence, for in a highly politicized area of 
social science it makes no sense simply to count the number of arti-
cles on each side. If the evidence is so mixed as not to suggest a 
conclusion, we should not lightly abandon our original theories un-
less our look at the data suggests that some of our premises are 
wrong. These judgments apply not only to the perspective I have 
presented but also to the differing perspectives of readers who have 
not been persuaded by my attempt to articulate what I perceive as 
common sense. 
1. Sellin and Others 
The early research on capital punishment, by which I mean all 
the work before Furman v. Georgia, 52 failed to show that capital pun-
ishment deterred homicide. Although a failure to show a deterrent 
effect does not mean one does not exist, by 1972 there had been a 
enough different work so that the conclusion that capital punishment 
does not deter appeared justified to most social scientists. 
The work of one man, Thorsten Sellin, dominates this period, but 
before we look at Sellin's work, other research deserves mention. In 
an important early study, Schuessler examined several different 
kinds of data, using both a comparative and a before-and-after ap-
proach.53 He reports that average homicide rates for the three five-
year periods beginning in 1931 tend to be no higher (and are often 
lower) in the abolitionist states of Rhode Island, Michigan, Wiscon-
sin, and Minnesota than in their retentionist neighbors. He presents 
51. This is not to say that the research individually is of a generally high quality. All of it 
is fl.awed, some seriously so. Fortunately the flaws are often different, so that weaknesses of 
one study are strengths of another. Thus the research as a body is stronger than the sum of its 
parts. The major flaws common to some of the best studies are the limitations posed by homi-
cide rate data that do not distinguish premeditated and nonpremeditated murders and the 
paucity of valid data measuring other variables of interest over time. 
52. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
53. Schuessler, The JJetellent I'!fluence of the JJeath Penalty, 284 ANNALS 54 (1952). 
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data from Sweden and the Netherlands which show no apparent in-
crease in homicide rates attributable to the abolition of the death 
penalty. He points out that South Dakota, which went from an abo-
litionist to a retentionist state in 1939, saw its homicide rate fall from 
1.8 per 100,00054 population to 1.5 during the next decade, but notes 
that North Dakota, which remained abolitionist, saw its rate fall 
from 1.8 to 1.1. 
Schuessler also looks at the impact of executions. He finds that 
for forty-one death penalty states the correlation between the 
number of executions per thousand homicides and the homicide rate 
is -.26.55 This is in the direction predicted by deterrence theory, but 
it is small and presumably statistically insignificant. 56 Contrary to 
the predictions of deterrence theory, when states are grouped into 
quartiles according to their homicide rates, the quartile composed of 
states with the highest homicide rates has a higher execution risk 
than the next two lower quartiles. Schuessler summarizes his view of 
his findings in the conclusion that "[t]he fact that men continue to 
argue in favor of the death penalty on deterrence grounds may only 
demonstrate man's ability to confuse tradition with proof, and his 
related ability to justify his established way of behaving."57 
Research investigating the deterrence question from different 
perspectives yields results consistent with Schuessler's conclusions. 
Dann examined homicides in Philadelphia for sixty days before and 
54. All homicide rates described are per 100,000 population. This base will no longer be 
noted in the text. 
55. A correlation coefficient is a way of su=arizing the association between two vari-
ables. If the correlation coefficient is positive, increases in one variable tend to be associated 
with increases in the other. If it is negative increases in one variable tend to be associated with 
decreases in the other. A correlation of-.26 between execution rates and homicide rates sug-
gests a moderate tendency for states high in execution rates to be low in homicide rates. The 
explanatory power of a correlation coefficient is best estimated by the square of that coefficient. 
Thus a correlation coefficient of -.26 means that if one knows the values taken by one variable 
he can explain about 7% of the variance (not 26%) in the associated variable. 
56. A significance test indicates the probability that a pattern that characterizes certain 
data such as a pattern of association might be attributable to chance or random factors and not 
reflect actual patterns in the population being studied. The conventional level of statistical 
significance in the social sciences is .05 which means that one is justified in dismissing the 
hypothesis that a relationship is an artifact of chance if random effects alone could not be 
expected to result in a relationship like the one found on more than 5 occasions in 100 ex-
amined (or I occasion in 20). There is nothing sacred about the conventional .05 level. For 
some purposes one is justified in choosing a less rigorous standard to evaluate the possibility of 
random effects and for other purposes a more rigorous standard is appropriate. 
Schuessler does not report a significance test. I presume the correlation is insignificant 
primarily because of the weight that Schuessler believes it deserves. Note that the correlation 
might be biased so as to favor a finding of deterrence because the number of homicides enters 
the numerator of the homicide rate and the denominator of the execution risk measure. 
57. Schuessler, supra note 53, at 62. 
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after a publicized mass execution58 while Savitz looked at first-de-
gree murder rates in Philadelphia for the eight weeks before and af-
ter four highly publicized trials that culminated in death sentences. 59 
Neither study reports a deterrent effect although both are hampered 
in their search for deterrence by the relatively small number of 
homicides that could be expected to occur in the periods they ex-
amine. Samuelson used Delaware's decisions to abolish capital pun-
ishment in 1958 and to reinstitute it in 1961 as the occasion for a 
before-and-after study.60 He finds nothing which suggests that the 
homicide rate was affected by the period of abolition. 
Perhaps the most intriguing finding during this period was re-
ported by Graves, a California medical doctor.61 Graves took ad-
vantage of the fact that California scheduled all its executions on 
Fridays to compare homicide rates on the days preceding and fol-
lowing execution Fridays with the rates for the same days in non-
execution weeks immediately preceding, following or falling be-
tween execution weeks. He reports that execution weeks have signif-
icantly more homicides than nonexecution weeks on Thursdays and 
Fridays and significantly fewer on Saturdays and Sundays. It is not 
clear what one should make of these curious results. One possibility 
is that the prospect of an execution has brutalization effects that 
culminate on the evening of the execution and are followed by deter-
rent effects after the fact of execution sinks in. A more plausible 
explanation may be that this is one of those occasions when statisti-
cal significance is achieved by chance. Enough research has been 
done on deterrence that one can expect random factors to result in 
some surprising associations. 62 
While the early studies all suggest the same conclusion - that 
capital punishment does not deter - collectively they were probably 
less important in persuading the scientific establishment of that con-
58. R. DANN, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1935). 
59. Savitz,A Study in Capitol Punishment, 49 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Set. 338 
(1958). 
60. Samuelson, Why Was Capitol Punishment Restored in .Delaware?, 60 J. CRIM. L. CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 148 {1969). 
6 l. Graves, The .Deterrent Effect of Capitol Punishment in Coltfomio, in THE DEA TH PEN-
ALTY IN AMERICA, supra note l, at 322. 
62. Because of its policy implications, deterrence research is unusual in the social sciences 
in that results that fail to reject the null hypothesis (ie., the hypothesis that the death penalty 
does not deter) are often published. Thus a possible explanation of the minority of studies that 
show a deterrent effect is that despite achieved levels of statistical significance their results are 
due to chance. Enough independent investigations of the death penalty have been done that a 
few should show "statistically significant" evidence of deterrence or brutalization even if the 
deviation from patterns that would be expected if the death penalty did not deter were only 
random. 
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clusion than the work of one man, Thorsten Sellin. Sellin's basic 
methodology was to compare the yearly homicide rates of neighbor-
ing retentionist and abolitionist jurisdictions.63 One would expect 
neighboring jurisdictions to be alike with respect to factors other 
than the death penalty that lead people to commit crimes. If so, and 
if the death penalty deters, retentionist states should have lower 
homicide rates than nearby abolitionist jurisdictions. 64 Sellin 
showed that they do not.65 Indeed, for the period from 1920 to 1955, 
abolitionist states tend to have lower homicide rates than their reten-
tionist neighbors. Trends in homicide rates tend to be similar in 
neighboring states, suggesting that contiguous states are affected in 
much the same way by changes in social or environmental condi-
tions that are conducive to or inhibit homicide. However, the impli-
cations of Sellin's time series approach are clouded because his data 
also reveal that one may not assume as a general proposition that 
neighboring states are similar on factors other than the death penalty 
that encourage or inhibit homicide. If neighbors were similar, Sel-
lin's data would not - absent an implausibly large brutalization ef-
fect attributable to capital punishment - show the considerable gap 
in homicide rates that characterizes certain pairs of states such as 
Ohio and Michigan or Colorado and Kansas. The assumption is 
tenable for other states paired by Sellin, such as Iowa and Wiscon-
sin, but it remains unproven. 
A brick is not a wall. Sellin did not stop with his paired compari-
sons. He also looked at the way homicide rates changed when states 
abolished and/or reinstituted the death penalty. Data from Maine, 
Arizona, Colorado, Iowa, Missouri, Tennessee, Oregon, Washing-
ton, Kansas, South Dakota, and Delaware all fail to provide evi-
dence that the presence of the death penalty deters. These results, 
when coupled with the contiguous state research, provide more pow-
erful evidence of nondeterrence, for the methodologies are comple-
mentary. The contiguous state approach controls well for trends in 
63. See T. SELLIN, supra note 13. 
64. If one takes the deterrence doctrine seriously this conclusion is particularly strong be-
cause one would expect those intending to kill others to lure them to abolitionist jurisdictions 
and one would expect those engaging in felonies that might involve murder - such as armed 
robbery - to go out of their way to commit their crimes in abolitionist jurisdictions. Thus, a 
number of murders in abolitionist states will be murders that but for the lack of the death 
penalty would have occurred in the retentionist jurisdiction. Such effects would, of course, be 
mitigated by statistics which lumped unpremeditated homicides with first-degree murders and 
by the fact that in many first-degree murders the intent to kill does not arise until shortly 
before the slaying occurs. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to compare first-degree and 
felony murder rates for nearby border cities in retentionist and abolitionist jurisdictions. 
65. Sellin's data are summarized in six diagrams in his book. T. SELLIN, supra note 13, at 
26-33. 
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paired states but not for different initial conditions, while the before-
and-after studies control better for the initial conditions of the states 
examined than they do for changes in these conditions over time. 
Even if they stood alone, the before-and-after studies, although 
crudely done, would be strong evidence. While it is plausible to sup-
pose that capital punishment is abolished when homicide rates are 
falling and reinstituted when they are rising, thus explaining the lack 
of effects, in many cases the period of abolition was so brief that no 
trend could have been established. Furthermore, the homicide data 
from Arizona, Colorado, and Iowa are based on convictions. If ju-
ries are more reluctant to convict in close cases when the death pen-
alty is likely, the evidence from these states is biased against a 
finding of nondeterrence. 66 
Sellin reports a number of other statistics as well. He collects 
information on homicides or murder convictions before and after 
changes in the death penalty in Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, 
New Zealand, England, and parts of Australia and Germany. Noth-
ing in these data suggests that the existence of capital punishment 
has a deterrent effect. 67 He applies his comparative technique, con-
trolling for city size, to police homicides from 1919-1954 in aboli-
tionist and retentionist states, again not finding deterrence. 68 He 
reports that the annual average of policemen killed during the years 
1961-1963, about 1.3 per 10,000, was the same in the abolitionist 
states as in their death-penalty neighbors. 
Sellin also addresses the question of whether the death penalty is 
needed to deter those serving life terms.69 His 1965 data from forty-
seven jurisdictions show that thirty-seven of these shared a total of 
sixty-one prison homicides perpetrated by fifty-nine known and nine 
unknown off enders. Eight of the victims (but none of the eight 
prison staff who were killed) and eleven of the offenders were in abo-
litionist states. Of the thirteen offenders charged with first-degree 
murder, two were imprisoned in the abolitionist state of Michigan 
and eleven were in death penalty states. The three offenders who 
66. One might argue, implausibly I believe, that murderers would be more willing to fight 
to the death to avoid capture or to make special efforts to escape in death penalty states than in 
abolitionist jurisdictions. More plausibly, one may note that if capital punishment prevents 
murder primarily through normative validation, brief periods of abolition are unlikely to have 
a substantial effect on the homicide rate. 
67. T. SELLIN, supra note 13, at 38-50. 
68. Id at 55-57. These data were collected in a mail survey. They are weak in that the 
nonresponse rate was more than 50% and the reporting police departments may have differen-
tially suffered failures of institutional memory. 
69. Sellin, The J)eath Penalty and Police Safety, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 15, at 
138. 
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had been convicted of second-degree murders and the nine who had 
been convicted of capital crimes other than homicide were impris-
oned in jurisdictions that allowed the death penalty. 
It is difficult to interpret these data without information about the 
number of people imprisoned for various crimes under various con-
ditions in the different states, but one may risk a few conclusions. 
First, the 1965 data give us no reason to believe that the existence of 
the death penalty has a special deterrent effect on those serving life 
sentences or lengthy prison terms. (The fact that all the staff mem-
bers killed were in death penalty states is of particular interest.) Sec-
ond, those imprisoned for violent crimes have a disproportionate 
tendency to kill, and murderers may have a disproportionate ten-
dency to kill within the group of violent criminals.7° Finally, if all 
capital offenders were executed, a meaningful savings in life would 
occur.7 I However, our inability to predict dangerousness means that 
such a policy would take many more lives than it would save. Fur-
thermore, the vast majority of those executed would be killed unnec-
essarily, for if allowed to live they would not subsequently have 
committed murder. 
The research by Sellin and others which fails to find deterrence 
shares more than a common conclusion. Each of the researchers ap-
proaches his data in a relatively straightforward fashion, easily un-
derstood by laypersons. In every case it is easy to specify the results 
that would indicate that capital punishment deters homicide, and in 
no case are such results found. Some of the studies, particularly Sel-
lin's work, are attentive to the problem of controlling for factors that 
might mask a deterrent effect, but none uses the techniques of mod-
em mathematical social science to hold these factors constant. Some 
more recent research shares this commonality of style and, interest-
ingly enough, supports the same conclusion.72 
_ 70. It may be that the prospect of a lengthy sentence gives one a special incentive to kill 
either in the process of escape or out of frustration. If so, lives might be saved within prisons 
by reducing the sentences of serious felons. The problem is finding the point at which these 
savings are counterbalanced by increased crime outside the walls. 
71. The net savings depends on the number of capital offenders among those killed by 
capital offenders. Sellin does not provide these figures. 
72. The one exception I discovered is Lester. In a one page "article," Executions as a l}e-
terrent to Homicides, 44 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 562 (1979), he reports that between 1930 and 
1955, in 53.6% of 828 instances in which a state executed one or more offenders, the incidence 
of homicide decreased the following year. In only 46.7% of the 818 instances in which a state 
executed no one was there such a decrease. The difference is significant at the .01 level and, 
according to Lester, applies to years in which the incidence was increasing as well as to years 
in which the incidence was decreasing. In a second "article" of two paragraphs he reports that 
the likelihood that an execution year will be followed by a diminution in executions tends to 
~ greater for years when executions are more common. Lester, l)eterring Effect of Executions 
on Murder as a Function of Number and Proportion of Exei:iltkiizs, 45 PSYCHOLOGICAL REP. 
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King, for example, searched for a brutalization effect by compar-
ing homicide rates for those months when South Carolina's major 
newspapers carried execution stories with the average of the rates for 
the same months during the years immediately preceding and fol-
lowing. Although King does not find compelling evidence of brutal-
ization, he finds nothing suggestive of deterrence.73 Fattah finds 
nothing in Canadian data which suggests that either Canada's 1962 
moratorium on the death penalty or its decision in 1967 to abolish 
the death penalty for all but police murders had any effect on Ca-
nada's homicide rate.74 Although that rate rose dramatically after 
1962, the increase correlates almost perfectly with the increase in 
other categories of violent crime and is not as great. If the death 
penalty deterred, one would_ expect formerly capital crimes to in-
crease at a faster rate than the rate for crimes whose penalties had 
not changed.75 McKee and Sesnowitz, using regression analysis,76 
598 (1979). In neither article does Lester present enough of the underlying data or a detailed 
enough explanation of his approach to allow an intelligent discussion of his findings. In both 
articles it is possible that the result Lester identifies is either a regression artifact or a result of 
including years after 1960 when executions were rare and homicide rates were increasing for 
reasons that may have had nothing to do with executions. 
A regression artifact is a tendency for rates that are extreme at one point in time to be less 
extreme upon remeasurement because of the nature of the contribution that random factors 
make to extreme scores. For example, if a homicide rate reflects both consistent causes and 
random effects, years following years with exceptionally high homicide rates are likely to have 
lower rates because random effects in the extreme year are likely to have been consistently 
conducive to homicide (thus making it extreme) while in the subsequent year they are likely to 
be more balanced since random effects usually, but not always, balance out. If homicide 
sentences are more likely in years with high murder rates one would expect that subsequent 
years, when executions are carried out, will have lower rates even if the death penalty does not 
deter because of normal statistical fluctuations. If executions are carried out in the year of the 
sentence, one would expect years following execution years to have lower homicide rates re-
gardless of deterrence. 
73. King, The Brutalization Effect: Execution Publicity and the Incidence ef Homicide in 
South Carolina, 51 Soc. FORCES 683 (1978). . 
74. Fattah, The Canadian Experience with Abolition of the Death Penalty, in EXECUTIONS 
IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 121. 
75. One might argue, implausibly I believe, that most violent assaults are with intent to kill 
or at least with the knowledge that killing might result and so are deterred by the death pen-
alty. However, the increase in crime in the 1960s was not confined to violent crimes. Other 
crimes, like auto theft, also increased at rates faster than the murder rate. It appears there was 
a general breakdown in "law and order" during this period, perhaps reflecting an increase in 
the proportion of people in their most crime-prone years. 
76. McKee & Sesnowitz, Capital Punishment: The Canadian Experience, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL 
ECON. 145 (1977). 
"Regression analysis" is a statistical technique for exploring a relationship between two 
variables while (in the multivariate case) holding the impact of other variables constant. For 
example, consider the equation ofH = B1E + B2G where H = the homicide rate; E = the rate 
at which convicted killers are executed; G = handgun sales per 1000 inhabitants and B1 and 
B2 are coefficients that indicate the weights that should be given to the two explanatory or 
independent variables, E and G, so that they will best predict to H, the dependent variable or 
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and Klein77 make the same point with respect to United States data. 
variable to be explained. This equation indicates that homicide rates in (let us say) a state are 
determined by the state's execution rate and gun ownership rate. 
In a regression analysis based on the above equation the investigator says, in effect, let us 
take the model or hypothesized relationship that is specified in the equation and let us take the 
data we have collected on homicide rates, execution rates, and gun ownership and let us see if 
the data are consistent with the model. We learn from the output of the regression analysis 
how well we can predict to homicide rates ifwe know execution rates and gun ownership rates. 
This is typically indicated by the square of the multiple correlation coefficient, reported as R2, 
We can also learn whether either or both of our independent variables enhance our ability to 
predict to the homicide rate. This is typically done by evaluating the coefficients or weights 
attached to the independent variables. · rf they are zero or sufficiently close to zero that we are 
unwilling to discard the possibility that random factors explain any apparent relationship be-
tween independent and dependent variables (a possibility evaluated with the aid of signifi-
cance tests), we tentatively conclude that changes in the independent variable are not 
associated with (and hence cannot cause) changes in the dependent variable. 
An advantage of multiple regression is that it can reveal situations where an apparent asso-
ciation between two variables is an artifact of the way they both relate to a third variable. For 
example, suppose we had originally specified a model H = B1E and had found that the higher 
a state's execution rate the higher its homicide rate. Someone challenges this, arguing that 
homicides are really influenced by gun ownership and that we were fooled because states with 
high execution rates are also states in which many people buy guns. We then examine the data 
to see how they fit an equation that includes both E and G as independent variables. If the 
coefficient on the execution variable is close to zero it indicates that the critic's point was well 
taken. Once we take account of gun ownership rates, execution rates have no apparent effect 
on homicides. If the coefficient of E is negative, implying the lower an execution rate the 
higher a homicide rate, it suggests that if states had similar gun ownership rates those that 
executed more would have fewer homicides. Our initial pattern was re_versed because, so our 
theory tells us, states that tend to execute their murderers are states where people like to buy 
guns, behavior that conduces to homicide and is associated with executions. 
But, someone might ask, could not the relationship between homicides and executions be 
again reversed if a third explanatory variable were introduced into the model? The answer is 
that it could be. When a model does not include adequate indicators of those independent 
variables that in fact determine the state of the dependent variables or when the mathematical 
form of the variables does not reflect the relationship that actually exists in the data (as when 
an equation implies a linear relationship between changes in the independent and dependent 
variables and the actual relationship is curvilinear) the model is said to be misspecified. Prac-
tically speaking, no mathematical model confined to measurable variables can ever capture the 
complexity of the real world, so all models are inevitably misspecified. Whether the problem is 
so serious as to render the relationships that a model reveals, or the absence of any revealed 
relationships, suspect varies with the particular model and the behavior it is designed to reflect. 
In making such judgments, theory is crucial. If a model contains those variables that are 
theoretically plausible or adequate proxies for them, and if it specifies a reasonable relation-
ship among variables, results consistent with the model should be given great weight and in-
consistent results should call the theory into question. On the other hand, if a model is 
misspecified by, for example, omitting a theoretically important variable, the conclusions sug-
gested by the model are suspect since the inclusion of a theoretically important variable can 
dramatically change the coefficients of those variables incorporated in the model. 
Finally, one must recognize an inductive side to the task of model building. It is co=on 
for researchers to try to fit a variety of models to their data. The one which fits best is inter-
preted as the most likely representation of the actual relationship between variables. If the fit 
is good and the relationships reasonable in the sense that they are theoretically plausible and 
consistent with other research, we have reason to believe the model portrays important aspects 
of the relationship, but we cannot be certain that some model we have not tested does not do a 
better job. 
77. Klein, Forst & Filatov, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: An Assessment of 
the Estimates, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION 336 (A. Blumstein, J. Cohen & D. Nagin 
eds. 1978). 
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Fattah's conclusion that the abolition of the death penalty is not re-
sponsible for the general increase in homicides is supported by his 
finding that police homicides, which remained capital, increased 
along with other murders. 
Phillips, looking at homicides in London during the periods sur-
rounding twenty-two well-publicized executions, presents results 
reminiscent of and as puzzling as Graves's findings.78 If the four 
weeks before the twenty-two executions are taken as a baseline, one 
sees in Phillips' data a sharp dip in the number of homicides during 
the execution week and the week thereafter. However, during the 
second through fifth weeks after these executions, the homicid.e rate 
rises sufficiently above that of the baseline period as to, within the 
limits of plausible statistical error, offset any immediate deterrent 
impact. Phillips also presents data suggesting that the more publi-
cized an execution the greater its temporary deterrent impact. Un-
fortunately, he does not tell us whether the more publicized 
executions contribute disproportionately to delayed brutalization ef-
fects. This is possible. In the seven days following each of Phillips's 
eleven most publicized executions, there are more than three times as 
many homicides (sixteen in all) than there are in seven days follow-
ing each of his eleven least-publicized executions (five in all). 
Finally, Bowers, in an analysis of abolitionist and contiguous 
death penalty states, finds that the increase in homicides after the 
informal judicial moratorium on executions in 1967 was slightly 
greater in the abolitionist states than in their contiguous death pen-
alty counterparts.79 If capital punishment deterred, one would ex-
pect those states which had lost an effective deterrent to have the 
higher rates of increase. Zeise! corroborates Bower's findings by 
showing that, throughout the sixties, homicide rates in executing and 
nonexecuting states (the abolitionist states and six states that exe-
cuted no one after 1948) grew at almost the same rate. so 
The strength of the research reviewed thus far rests not in indi-
vidual studies but on the work taken as a whole. Deterrent effects of 
capital punishment have been given many different kinds of chances 
to appear. If capital punishment has any strong deterrent effects, it is 
likely that some deterrence would have been evident. While it is 
78. Phillips, Tlze JJeterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: New Evidence on an Old Contro-
versy, 86 AM. J. Soc. 139 (1980). 
79. EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA, supra note 43, at 139-47. 
80. Zeise!, Tlze JJeterrent Effect of the JJeath Penalty: Facts v. Faiths, 1976 SUP. CT. REv. 
317, 330. 
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impossible to prove a negative, this failure to find a -deterrent effect 
provides reason to believe that none exists. 
2. Enter Ehrlich 
Although there were occasional dissenters (never with empirical 
evidence), the conclusion that the death penalty does not deter was 
the general consensus of the scientific establishment until 1975. In 
that year an economist, Isaac Ehrlich, published in his profession's 
most prestigious journal what is probably the most important article 
on capital punishment to date.81 The article, aptly subtitled "A 
Question of Life and Death," is important for its timing, its methods, 
and its results. 
Ehrlich apparently finished work on his article about the time the 
Supreme Court was to hear argument on the constitutionality of the 
first of the post-Furman capital punishment statutes. At a time when 
the article was still unpublished, the Solicitor General of the United 
States included a draft version as an appendix to the government's 
pro-capital punishment brief. Because the Court eventually put the 
issue of capital punishment off for a term, both the article and pieces 
in rebuttal were in print by the time Gregg v. Georgia 82 and its com-
panion cases were decided. The use of Ehrlich's article by the Solici-
tor General guaranteed that it would attract substantial attention, 
perhaps more than it merited. 83 
One aspect of this scenario deserves at least passing mention, al-
though it is admittedly a digression from my chosen task. Ehrlich's 
research cannot be fully appreciated without the benefit of the scien-
tific comment it engendered. Had the Supreme Court not delayed its 
decision on the death penalty, there would have been little or no 
prior opportunity for others to examine Ehrlich's work. Perhaps be-
cause of the Court's delay, there has not been the discussion of the 
scientific and legal ethics of submitting controversial unpublished re-
search to the Court which the earlier disclosure of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's appendix might otherwise have engendered. The legal 
community should explore this problem before the next occasion 
arises.84 
81. Ehrlich, The .Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Lffe and .Death, 65 
AM. ECON. REV. 397 (1975). 
82. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
83. For example, Ehrlich's later cross-sectional study, which shows even greater deterrence 
and is probably a sounder piece of research, has neither been fully replicated nor subjected to 
the same degree of scrutiny. Ehrlich, Capital Punishment and .Deterrence: Some Further 
Thoughts and Additional Evidence, 85 J. PoL. EcoN. 741 (1977). 
84. The reader may correctly gather that I consider lhe ethical question a serious one, 
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Ehrlich's study was important because it was explicitly based on 
economic theory and because it brought the techniques of modem 
econometrics to bear on the problem of deterrence and capital pun-
ishment. Its methods have stimulated enough research so that we 
may credit Ehrlich with bringing a new paradigm to the study of the 
death penalty and deterrence. 
Ehrlich's article was important because its finding that executions 
deterred homicide effectively reopened the deterrence controversy. 
Its immediate effects are reflected in Justice Stewart's lead opinion in 
Gregg v. Georgia, the case that restored death as a permissible pen-
alty. Justice Stewart notes the debate occasioned by the statistical 
attempts to evaluate the death penalty as a deterrent and concludes: 
"The results simply have been inconclusive ."85 Ehrlich's is the only 
empirical study suggesting deterrence that Stewart cites in support of 
this proposition. While it is unlikely that the- Court would have 
decided Gregg differently but for Ehrlich's research, his results did 
mean that some Justices were able to avoid confronting the difficult 
question of how to justify a penalty that within the scientific commu-
nity was generally acknowledged to take lives without compensating 
savings. 
Since Gregg, Ehrlich's research has been used to do more than to 
establish the existence of an inconclusive debate. Van den Haag and 
other modem retributivists have used Ehrlich's :findings to bolster 
their case for the death penalty.86 In a more overtly political context, 
the effort to amend Michigan's constitution and end that state's 134 
years without capital punishment has publicized Ehrlich's :findings in 
its newspaper campaign. Clearly this is research that merits close 
examination. 
To call an article the most important in its field is high praise, but 
this is about the last praise I shall have for Ehrlich. To anticipate 
briefly, Ehrlich's 1975 article provides no support for the proposition 
that the death penalty deters. It has stirred up the pond, but only to 
muddy the waters at a time when we need to see clearly. There is 
now a substantial body of research criticizing Ehrlich on technical 
although I am not sure how I would answer it. It raises among other issues the question of the 
obligation of an attorney to evaluate or seek an independent evaluation of the scientific ade-
quacy of work he wishes to present to a court. It also raises ethical problems for the scientific 
community whose members' work may be used in this way. I want to make it quite clear that I 
do not intend the above as a criticism of Professor Ehrlich for the use made of his work. My 
hearsay understanding is that the government sought out Ehrlich's study; he did not volunteer 
it. 
85. 428 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1976) (emphasis added). 
86. E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS, supra note l; van den Haag,A Response to 
Bedau, 1977 ARlz. ST. LJ. 797. 
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and conceptual grounds. 87 The criticism is persuasive. 
Ehrlich's study is a multivariate regression analysis of the rela-
tionship between annual homicide rates for the nation as a whole 
and the rate at which convicted murderers were executed between 
the years 1933 and 1969.88 The variables Ehrlich attempts89 to con-
trol include, most importantly, two measures of successful law en-
forcement: the probability of arrest for homicide and the probability 
of conviction given arrest. They also include measures of population 
characteristics that might affect the homicide rate, such as labor 
force participation, unemployment rates, and changing proportions 
87. See, e.g., Baldus & Cole,A Comparison of the Work of Thorsten Sellin and Isaac Ehrlich 
on the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 85 YALE L.J. 170 (1975); Barnett, Crime and 
Capital Punishment: Some Recent Studies, 6 J. CRIM. JusT. 291 (1978); Black & Orsagh, New 
Evidence on the Efficacy of Sanctions as a Deterrent to Homicide, 58 Soc. Sci. Q. 616 (1978); 
Bowers & Pierce, The Illusion of Deterrence in Isaac Ehrlich's Research on Capital Punishment, 
85 YALE LJ. 187 (1975); Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 77; McGahey, Dr. Ehrlich's Magic 
Bullet: Economic Theory, Econometrics, and the Death Penalty, 26 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 
485 (1980); Passell & Taylor, The Detellent Effect of Capital Punishment: Another View, 67 
AM. EcoN. REv. 445 (1977); Passell & Taylor, The Deterrence Controversy: A Reconsideration 
of the Time Series, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 359; 
Peck, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Ehrlich and His Critics, 85 YALE L.J. 359 
(1976); Zeise!, supra note 80. 
For Ehrlich's responses, see Ehrlich, J)etellence: Evidence and l'!ference, 85 YALE L.J. 209 
(1975); Ehrlich, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: Reply, 67 AM, EcoN, REV. 452 
(1977); Ehrlich & Gibbons, On the Measurement of the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment 
and the Theory of Deterrence, 6 J. LEGAL STUD, 35 (1977); Ehrlich & Mark, supra note 41. 
88. Ehrlich estimates his model for a variety of periods ranging from 1933-1966 to 1935-
1969 and 1941-1969. He also measures the conditional probability of execution in several 
ways. Generally his results are consistent. Ehrlich transforms all variables except time into 
their natural logarithms. Although he states that his results are robust with respect to func-
tional form, others who have replicated Ehrlich's research, e.g., Bowers & Pierce, supra note 
87; Klein, supra note 77; Passell & Taylor, supra note 87, report that the significance of the 
execution variable disappears and the results sometimes become perversely positive if the nat• 
ural values of the variables are used. Much of the technical exchange between Ehrlich and his 
critics concerns the relative desirability of the logarithmic transformations. 
Transforming data is commonly done and often wise. Logarithmic transformations of all 
variables imply relationships in the form of elasticities (f.e., relationships in which a propor-
tionate change in an independent variable is associated with a proportionate change in the 
dependent variable) rather than linear relationships (f.e., relationships in which an incremental 
change in an independent variable is associated with an incremental change in the dependent 
variable). Decisions on transforming data depend primarily on what theory suggests about the 
nature of the relationships, although there are tests that indicate inductively that one form may 
better represent the true pattern of association. In the case of Ehrlich's work there is no strong 
theoretical reason to prefer logarithmic to untransformed variables, althou'711 if Ehrlich's ar~u-
ment in response to liis critics is accepted there may be some, albeit not d1spositive, inductive 
reason. In research of this kind, relationships between variables are often similar in both di-
rection and significance regardless of whether the data has been transformed. The fact that 
Ehrlich's results are form dependent is, as his critics contend, a further reason to be suspicious 
of them. This is because there is no good a priori reason to prefer a log-log specification to a 
linear one, and not because there is anything inherently illegitimate about the transformation 
procedure. 
89. I use the word "attempts" because the quality of the data, particularly in the earlier 
years with respect to such things as conviction rates, is quite problematic. See Bowers & 
Pierce, supra note 87, at 187-92. 
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of nonwhites. Ehrlich's most important finding is summarized in his 
introduction: "On the average the tradeoffbetween the execution of 
an off ender and the lives of potential victims it might have saved was 
of the order of magnitude of 1 for 8 for the period.1933-1967 in the 
United States."90 This is basically what Ehrlich's equations tell us. I 
shall review only some of the less technical reasons why one who 
conscientiously wishes to rest the moral case for capital punishment 
on deterrence can get no comfort from Ehrlich's results. 1 
Ehrlich criticizes Sellin's research on two counts: it con§iders 
only the legal status of the death penalty and not its application,91 
and it fails to control other factors affecting the murder rate.92 
Baldus and Cole defend Sellin from both charges.93 They point out 
that in the debate over capital punishment the question is whether to 
change from a death penalty to an abolitionist jurisdiction, a ques-
tion which Sellin's work addresses directly but Ehrlich's does not. 
They also point out that Sellin's matching method is an attempt to 
control for other variables which in the particular context of capital 
punishment may be as adequate as Ehrlich's. Finally, Baldus and 
Cole present data for 1960 that arguably show that the states 
matched by Sellin are similar on important law enforcement and ·so-
cioeconomic characteristics.94 
Baldus and Cole are right on their first point, but their defense is 
telling only if retentionist states will in the future follow historic pat-
terns of sparing most of those eligible for execution. Ehrlich's find-
ings are surely relevant to the policy debate, for if he is correct, states 
adopting the death penalty may wish to change their patterns of sen-
tencing,95 and there is moral justification for allowing them to do so. 
On their second point, Baldus and Cole are more persuasive in 
their attack than on defense.96 They note that in a regression analy-
sis, the omission of an important variable from the model tested may 
90. Ehrlich, supra note 81, at 398. 
91. Id 
92. Ehrlich, .Deterrence: Evidence and Infare"nce, 85 Yale L.J. 209, 223-24 (1975). 
93. Baldus & Cole, supra note 87, at 170. 
94. Id at 179. The problem with these data are that they are for a single year, five years 
after Sellin's time series ends. Furthermore, on some variables it is not clear what degree of 
cross-state similarity is meaningful. 
95. It should be noted that Ehrlich in his 1975 article, supra note 81, is quite restrained in 
discussing the policy implications of his research. He recognizes that increased executions may 
not be the preferred method of coping with the homicide problem and he never expresses 
personal support for the death penalty. 
96. As was mentioned in my discussion of Sellin's work, some of the gaps in the homicide 
rates of matched states are so large that one can be sure that factors which significantly affect 
homicide rates are not well controlled. 
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not only prevent an adequate explanation of changes in the depen-
dent variable (here the homicide rate), but may also distort the ef-
fects of those variables that have been included. Klein and his 
coauthors, who make a similar point, suggest that the average length 
of prison sentences for homicide and the availability of guns are two 
omitted variables that may be crucial.97 Passell and Taylor would 
add racial tension and the frustration of unrealized rising expecta-
tions to this list.9s 
I shall make three criticisms of Ehrlich's work. One goes solely 
to its policy implications while two challenge the validity of his re-
sults. In Ehrlich's model, the deterrent effects of the probability of 
execution given conviction are dwarfed by the deterrent effects of the 
probability of conviction given arrest. It is commonly thought that 
the possibility of capital punishment makes it more difficult to con-
vict, and there is evidence that supports this view.99 If the presence 
of the death penalty were to reduce the conviction rate for homicide 
by seventeen percent, Ehrlich's own findings indicate that executing 
would be counterproductive.100 My intuition is that the presence of 
the death penalty would not reduce convictions this far, but it might 
well reduce them to the point where the tradeoff between executions 
97. Klein, supra note 77, at 345-46. 
98. Passell & Taylor, supra note 87, 67 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. at 448. 
99. Ellsworth and Ross report that in North Carolina when a mandatory death sentence 
. for first-degree burglary replaced a discretionary one convictions for this offense went from an 
annual average of 40 to an average of three. They also report a survey of 500 citizens in four 
municipalities in California. Among proponents of the death penalty, 60% claimed that if they 
sat on a jury in a murder trial they would require "much more" or "somewhat more" evidence 
to vote guilty if the relevant penalty were death. Forty percent of those opposed to capital 
punishment said they could never vote guilty in these circumstances. Ellsworth & Ross, .Public 
Opinion and Judicial .Decisionmaking: An Example From Research on Capital .Punishment, in 
CAPITAL PuNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 5, at 152, 166-69. However, where 
the death penalty is not mandatory it might be easier to convict because jury holdouts for 
acquittal might compromise on a verdict that saves the defendant from death. Also the possi-
bility of the death penalty, whether or not mandatory, may make it easier for prosecutors to 
secure convictions by plea bargains. 
100. In his 1975 article, Ehrlich notes that over the period 1933 to 1969 when the propor-
tion of convicts executed for murder fell from 8% to zero, the probabilities of arrest and con-
viction given arrest generally increased. Ehrlich, supra note 81, at 405. In later responses to 
critics, Ehrlich notes that the estimated unconditional risk of conviction decreases from 39% in 
1960 to 31% in 1969. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 87, 67 AM. EcoN. REV. 452. (An uncondi-
tional risk of conviction is the probability of conviction without taking into account the 
probability of arrest. Thus, one might report that 36% of all murders resulted in convictions -
an unconditioned rate when the murder is taken as the starting point - or that 55% of those 
arrested for murder were convicted of it - a conviction rate conditioned on arrest.) However, 
here Ehrlich may be reading too much into uncontrolled data. This decrease may result from 
procedural constraints imposed on the police during this period or problems caused by case 
overload. Depending on the source of the data, it may also reflect bargained pleas to offenses 
other than homicide. Had the death penalty been imposed regularly during this period, the 
unconditional conviction rate might have been still lower. 
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and lives saved would have vitally different policy implications. One 
might, for example, be substantially less willing to tolerate the pros-
pect of innocent people being executed or the existence of invidious 
discrimination within a system of capital punishment if each execu-
tion saved three lives rather than eight. 
A second difficulty with Ehrlich's study, which he himself recog-
nizes, is its failure to include any measure of the length of prison 
sentences in general and the probability of life sentences in particu-
lar. This is not a mere technical deficiency; it is fundamental. With-
out some measure of the probability of life sentences, Ehrlich's 
research does not address the fundamental issue in the debate. That 
issue is not whether executions deter, but whether they deter more 
than prison sentences for ltfe. 
Nothing in Ehrlich's data suggests that there would have been 
any diminution in deterrence had everyone who was executed been 
sentenced to life imprisonment instead. The implication that Ehrlich 
is finding a marginal effect depends on the assumption that the kinds 
of murderers who would have been executed or sentenced to life im-
prisonment during periods of frequent executions were sentenced to 
life imprisonment during periods when executions were infrequent. 
Jayewardene tells us that this assumption is untenable in the case of 
Canada. 101 During the late 1960s, when the death penalty ceased to 
be applied to homicide offenders, the expectation of a term sentence 
for less than life increased. Furthermore, the positive correlation be-
tween the increasing homicide rate and the expectation of a prison 
term less than life was greater and statistically more significant than 
the negative correlation between the expectancy of a death sentence 
and the rising homicide rate. The same may be true of the United 
States, for the same factors which lead a state to cease executing may 
lead it to shorten its sentences so that the perceived penalty for even 
serious homicide becomes considerably less than life imprison-
ment.102 Thus, aspects of the sentencing structure other than the 
death penalty may entirely explain effects that Ehrlich would attri-
bute to death. 
The third problem with Ehrlich's research is so basic that if we 
IOI. C. JAYEWARDENE, supra note 34. 
102. The average time served for all nonnegligent homicides is remarkably short, typically 
less than ten years and in many cases less than five. See, e.g., Glaser & Zeigler, Use of the 
Death Penalty v. Outrage al Murder, 20 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 333, 336 (1974). For a con-
troversy over the implications Glaser and Zeigler draw from these data, see Bailey, Use of the 
Death Penalty v. Outrage at Murder: Some Additional Evidence and Considerations, 22 CRIME 
& DELINQUENCY 31 (1976); Glaser, A Response to Bailey, 22 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 40 
(1976). 
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accepted Ehrlich's model and thought his data sound we could prop-
erly regard his research as providing support for the proposition that 
during the years when the death penalty was regularly employed ex-
ecutions did not deter. Replication of Ehrlich's research consistently 
reveals that when data from the years 1965 through 1969 are elimi-
nated from the analysis the impact of the conditional probability of 
execution on the homicide rate is no longer statistically significant. 
Indeed, excluding years after 1962 and treating variables in their 
natural rather than logarithmic forms produces insignificantly posi-
tive associations between the probability of execution and the homi-
cide rate; that is, the data fit Ehrlich's model so as to suggest, 
although not at conventional levels of statistical reliability, that 
higher likelihoods of executions are associated with higher homicide 
rates. 103 
One cannot fully understand the degree to which these :findings 
destroy Ehrlich's conclusion without appreciating the strength of 
Ehrlich's approach. Ehrlich's argument that executions deter homi-
cide is, in the first instance, not empirical. It is a theoretical argu-
ment drawn from Ehrlich's understanding of the economic model of 
human behavior. While one might reasonably have a very different 
conception of forces that affect potential murderers, Ehrlich's con-
ception is sufficiently congruent with one accepted view of "eco-
nomic man" that it should be taken seriously. Ehrlich uses empirical 
evidence to test the soundness of a theory. The fact that his theory, 
carefully specified in advance, is confirmed by his data gives us fur-
ther confidence in the soundness of that theory. It is from that the-
ory that we draw the conclusion that executions save lives. The 
empirical results serve only to confirm the theory and to supply us 
with an estimate of the trade-off. 
However, nothing about the theory of economic man suggests 
that people ought to respond to incentives one way during the period 
1933-1962 or 1935-1964, and another way during the period 1933-
1969 or 1941-1969.104 Thus, the sensitivity of Ehrlich's results to 
time destroys the theoretical underpinnings of his approach. Unless 
a theory can be offered that accommodates the temporal sensitivity 
103. Passell & Taylor, supra note 87, at 362-63. 
104. Ehrlich's response to his critics on this point is that truncating the data at 1962 or 1964 
is statistically unsound because it sacrifices degrees of freedom needed to subject the theory to 
a fair test. See Ehrlich, supra note 92, at 214-17; Ehrlich & Randall, supra note 66, at 297. 
However, in his original article, Ehrlich presents several truncations at the other end of his 
time series, including one at 1941 which costs more degrees of freedom than the 1964 trunca-
tions and still yields statistically significant results. 
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of the data, Ehrlich's results are a statistical curiosity. There is no 
way to explain them. 
To transform Ehrlich's results from evidence that executions de-
ter to evidence consistent with the opposite conclusion, one must 
show that Ehrlich's model is more adequately specified for the pe-
riod 1933-1964 than for the longer time frame. This is the case if 
there are factors not measured by Ehrlich's variables which might 
have had an important influence on the homicide rate in the 1960s 
but are not likely to have affected homicide rates at an earlier time. 
Possibilities noted in the literature include racial tension, the 
proliferation of handguns, the Viet Nam War, the political assassina-
tions of the sixties and the disjunction between real achievement and 
rising expectations. Of these, the proliferation of handguns may be 
most important. Zimring has shown that in violent attacks guns are 
substantially more lethal than other likely alternatives, 105 and there 
was a marked upsurge in the purchase of guns for nonsporting pur-
poses in the 1960s. Kleck has recently estimated a model designed to 
explain homicides during the period 1947-1973. He finds that the 
level of gun ownership is an important explanatory variable, while 
different measures of execution risk are statistically insignificant and 
often have perversely positive coefficients (j.e., coefficients that sug-
gest the more a state executes the higher its homicide rate ). 106 
3. The Sharp Prediction 
Another way of evaluating Ehrlich's results is to treat them not as 
the test of a hypothesis but as a statement of one. That hypothesis is 
Ehrlich's "sharp prediction" concerning the elasticity of the murder 
rate with respect to the conditional probability of executions. Evalu-
ating that elasticity at the average rates of murders and executions 
over the period 1935-1969 yields Ehrlich's much publicized conclu-
sion that each execution might have saved- eight lives. We can ask 
whether the data relating executions to homicide rates is consistent 
with this conclusion. Bailey has asked that question with respect to 
California, 107 North Carolina, 108 Oregon, 109 and Utah. 110 His gen-
105. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 721 
(1968). 
106. Kleck, Capital Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. Soc. 882 (1979). 
107. Bailey, The Deterrent E.ffec( of the Death Penalty far Murder in Calffomia, 52 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 743 (1979). 
108. Bailey, An Analysis of the Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty in North Carolina, 10 
N.C. CENT. L.J. 29 (1978). 
109. Bailey, Deterrence and the Death Penalty far Murder in Oregon, 16 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 67 (1979). 
110. Bailey, Detellence and the Death Penalty far Murder in Utah: A Time Series Analysis, 
5 J. CONTEMP. L. l (1978). 
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eral approach is to use multiple regression analysis to measure the 
effect of executions on homicide rates within states beginning about 
1910 or 1920 and ending about 1960,111 controlling for changes in 
each state's nonwhite population, male population, unemployment 
rate, urban population, and population between twenty and forty-
nine years old. Bailey measures homicide rates in two ways, ex-
plores the effects of lagged execution rates, and reports results for 
both ordinary and two-stage least squares. Whatever the particular 
method and measures, the results in each state are similar. Whether 
executions have a positive effect on the homicide rate (as they some-
times do) or their predicted negative effect, the effect is always small 
and statistically insignificant. Executions are invariably less impor-
tant in predicting homicide rates than most or all of the control vari-
ables. Ehrlich's prediction receives no support from these data. 
I have tried a conceptually simpler approach to testing Ehrlich's 
conclusion as an hypothesis. 112 It begins with the observation that in 
Sellin's contiguous states fluctuations in homicide rates over time 
tend to be similar. Thus, whatever the initially important differences 
in factors that predict to homicide, changes in adjacent states from 
year to year tend not to be dramatically different. If one execution 
saves eight lives, one would expect differences in annual homicide 
rates to reflect yearly differences in executions. The advantage of the 
more persistently executing state should increase with each addi-
tional execution. Indeed, assuming that Ehrlich is correct, one may 
calculate the expected effect of executions on homicide rates by mul-
tiplying the difference in the number of executions times eight and 
dividing by the population in 100,000s of the more persistently exe-
cuting state. Thus, if a state of four million people executes five 
111. Because Bailey needs information available only for census years to control for cer-
tain factors, he treats homicide rates as dependent only during census years and the two years 
preceding and following. The assumption is that state demographic characteristics do not 
change so rapidly that there is substantial error introduced by assuming that decile data is 
characteristic of the two years before and after. · 
Bailey changes his measure of homicide rates from Vital Statistics to FBI data for years 
after 1933 when the latter became available because he believes that the FBI data more closel_y 
approximate the rate of murders punishable by death. He may be right, but this switch 1s 
nonetheless unfortunate since the different biases of the two data sets can affect the results. 
The degree to which the results may be affected and the direction of any effects cannot be 
estimated from the information Bailey presents. 
I 12. Lempert, The .Deterrent Effect of the .Death Penalty: A New Look in an Old Light 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Law Review). This paper provides not only 
the results of this research, but also a detailed discussion of the rationale behind my approach 
and of the various assumptions, regarding such things as lag times and appropriate comparison 
periods, that guided the analysis of the data. 
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murderers in a given year, Ehrlich's results lead one to expect that 
the state's homicide rate for that year will be one per 100,000 less 
than it would have been had the state executed no one. The state's 
homicide rate should compare more favorably with the rate of an 
abolitionist neighbor than it does in years when the state executes 
fewer people. 
This procedure has several advantages over Sellin's procedure, 
and two of them respond to Ehrlich's criticisms. It not only promises 
better control on other relevant variables (since each state is to some 
extent its own control), but it also allows comparisons between death 
penalty states and speaks to the issue of whether executions deter. 
Applying this approach to states examined by Sellin yields results 
quite inconsistent with Ehrlich's prediction. Overall there is no evi-
dence that states do better than their neighbors in discouraging 
homicide in years when they are relatively more prone to execute. 
Almost all results are statistically insignificant, and about as many 
run counter to deterrence theory as support it. Of those results in the 
predicted direction, fewer than half suggest that a single execution 
saves as many as four lives. 
In sum, the results that Ehrlich presents in his well-known article 
deserve no place in the debate on capital punishment. The research 
is flawed conceptually and methodologically, and conclusions that 
have been drawn from the study are not supported by either the state 
level data examined by Baily and me or, using Ehrlich's preferred 
techniques, by national data when different time periods are ex-
amined or when other plausible variables, like levels of gun owner-
ship, are included in the regression equations. 
4. Other Econometric Approaches 
Ehrlich's work is the precursor of numerous studies using multi-
ple regression analysis and, in some cases, simultaneous equation 
models. 113 Most of these studies find no evidence that executions 
deter. The two best conceived studies, those of Forst and Knorr, use 
1 13. A simultaneous equation model takes into account the reciprocal influences that may 
exist between variables. Thus the homicide rate is influenced by the execution rate if death 
sentences deter murder. However, the execution rate is influenced by the homicide rate if 
executions are most likely when murder rates are high. A model that controls for simultaneous 
relationships requires more than one equation and may be contrasted with a single equation 
model Because the reciprocal interaction between homicides and execution appears reason-
able if executions deter, simultaneous equation models are likely to test the deterrence hypoth-
esis more adequately than single equation models. However, special problems that arise in 
testing simultaneous equation models may limit their utility. See Fisher & Nagin, On the 
Feasibility of Identifying the Crime Function in a Simultaneous Model of Crime Rates and Sanc-
tion Levels, in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 77, at 361. 
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temporal cross-sectional models. 114 Neither Forst, who examines the 
years 1960 and 1970, nor Knorr, who looks at 1950 and 1960, finds 
evidence that executions deter. However, both studies have draw-
backs that make them oflimited relevance to the policy debate. The 
major drawback to Forst's study is his choice of years. By 1960, ex-
ecutions were already so infrequent that the subsequent decrease to 
zero may not be a fair measure of the deterrent efficacy of an active 
system (even by historical standards) of capital punishment. Knorr's 
study suffers because the unavailability of state data forces him to 
measure certain important effects at the national level. Holding 
these variables constant across states and regions undermines the 
strongest feature of his approach. 
There have been a number of recent examinations of the time 
series data that explore different time periods, use different func-
tional forms, and control for different variables. Among the studies 
that fail to find a significant deterrent effect of executions are those 
by Bailey,115 Bechdolt,116 K.leck,117 McKee and Sesnowitz,118 Passell 
and Taylor, 119 and Shin.120 Probably the most provocative of the 
recent times series analyses is a study by Bowers and Pierce explor-
ing the impact of executions on homicides in the state of New York 
between the years 1906 and 1963.121 Looking at the relationship be-
tween executions and homicides in the months following executions, 
they estimate that each execution leads to two or three homicides 
that would not otherwise have occurred. This brutalizing effect is 
strongest during the first month after an execution and has largely 
dissipated by the end of the next month. The authors also point out 
that a number of the econometric analyses, 122 as well as the less tech-
I 14. See Forst, The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Cross-State Analysis of the 
1960's, 61 MINN. L. REv. 743 (1977); Knorr, .Deterrence and the .Death Penalty: A Temporal 
Cross-Sectional Approach, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 235 (1979). 
Cross-sectional research on the death penalty typically takes a cross-section of some or all 
of the fifty states and examines differences among them. Temporal or time series research 
examines relationships in a single jurisdiction as they change over time. The studies by Forst 
and Knorr combine these approaches. 
llS. See articles cited in notes 107-I0mpra. 
I 16. Bechdolt, Capital Punishment and Homicide and Rape Rates in the United State: Time 
Series and Cross Sectional Regression Analyses, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 33 (1977). 
ll7. Kleck, mpra note 106. 
I 18. McKee & Sesnowitz, mpra note 80 (Canadian data). 
ll9. Passell & Taylor, mpra note 87. 
120. K. SHIN, DEATH PENALTY AND CRIME (1978). 
121. Bowers & Pierce, Deterrence or Brutalization: Whal is the Effect of Execution?, 26 
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 453 (1980). 
122. Bowers and Pierce cite the work of Kleck, supra note I 06, Klein, mpra note 77, Bai-
ley, mpra notes 107-110, and Passell, The Detellent Effect of the Death Penalty: A Statistical 
Test, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, mpra note 5, at 398. A number of 
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nical work of Dann, 123 Savitz, 124 Graves, 125 and King, 126 are consis-
tent with their results in that these studies, even if not producing 
statistically significant results, tend to show a positive association be-
tween executions and homicides. 
This study by Bowers and Pierce is an admirable first step in the 
search for the possible brutalization effects of executions, but it is 
obviously not the last word. It is limited by its focus on one state and 
by the limits that monthly data place on the ability to control for 
other factors.127 Also, in view of Phillips's :findings,128 one wishes 
that Bowers and Pierce had looked at homicides in the execution 
month. If Phillips :findings generalize, one would expect that homi-
cide rates during execution months would diminish substantially 
enough to offset later brutalization effects.129 
Apart from Ehrlich's work, the only two time series analyses sug-
gesting deterrence that I found in my search of the literature are by 
Yunker130 and Wolpin.131 Yunker's study is so idiosyncratic in its 
methodology that it could be dismissed out of hand even if his re-
sults did not imply the untenable conclusion that each execution pre-
vents 156 murders.132 Wolpin, working with the British data, 
estimates that each execution prevents four homicides. Unfortu-
nately, Wolpin's results are presented in summary fashion, so it is 
difficult to evaluate the study. Wolpin acknowledges that there are 
difficult methodological issues to be resolved and speaks of "impor-
other studies in this genre, e.g., K. SHIN, supra note 120, are also generally consistent with their 
observation. 
123. R. DANN, supra note 58. 
124. Savitz, supra note 59. 
125. Graves, supra note 61. 
126. King, supra note 73. 
127. Bowers and Pierce are able to control for general time trends, seasonality, and World 
War II and they adjust their data to correct for autocorrelated error. 
128. Phillips, supra note 78. 
129. If an execution occurred at the very end of a month or at the very beginning, Phillips's 
results would lead one to expect little or no brutalizing effect in the month following the execu-
tions. Thus, by examining months that do not fit the general pattern of brutalization and by 
noting the dates of executions in preceding months, Bowers and Pierce have an easy if crude 
check on the generalizeability of Phillips's findings. 
130. Yunker, Is the .Death Penalty a .Deterrent to Homicide? Some Time Series Evidence, 5 
J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 45 (1976). 
131. Wolpin, Capital Punishment and Homoclde in England: A Summary of Results, 90 AM. 
ECON. A. PAPERS &PRoc.422, (1978). 
132. Yunker identifies the deterrence function using only 1960 data and controls only for 
the unemployment rate in his analysis. For criticisms of Yunker, see Fox, The Ident!ftcation 
and Estimation of .Deterrence: An Evaluation of Yunker's Model, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 225 
(1977); Sensowitz & McKee, On the .Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL 
EcoN. 217 (1977). See Yunker, An Old Controversy Renewed, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL EcoN. 1 
(1977), for an indication that the author no longer has complete ~aith in his results. 
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tant limitations of the data."133 Polinsky, in a brief comment on 
W olpin, mentions two such limitations:· Wolpin does not control for 
the possibility that the average time served for homicide might have 
decreased as execution rates diminished, and Wolpin's model does 
not consider the immigration of different racial groups which may 
have accounted for the rapid increase in the English homicide rate 
after 1961.134 
In addition to the studies by Forst and Knorr mentioned above, 
cross-sectional research by Bechdolt, 135 Black and Orsagh, 136 Boyles 
and McPheters, 137 Passell, 138 and Shin 139 fails to reveal a deterrent 
effect. Studies by Cloninger140 and Ehrlich 141 find a deterrent effect 
with cross-sectional data. Cloninger, using a single equation model, 
finds that the execution rate over the years 1955-1959 has a signifi-
cant negative effect on homicides in thirty-two non-Southern - but 
not in sixteen Southern - states during 1960. As with Yunker, 
Cloninger's results may be rejected simply because of the implausi-
bility of the conclusions that follow from them. For example, Clon-
inger's results imply that the number of homicide deaths in Ohio in 
1960 would have been reduced from 311 to less than forty if only one 
more murderer had been executed during the years 1955-1959. 
Among the flaws in Cloninger's model are his failure to include in-
formation on sentence length and an execution variable based on 
five-year averages which, because of the decline in the number of 
executions in the late fifties, makes state penal action in 1955 more 
important in determining differences in 1960 homicide rates than 
state penal action in 1959. 
Ehrlich's 1977 paper is sounder in its approach to the problem 
133. Wolpin, supra note 131, at 422-23. 
134. Polinsky, Economics and Law, Discussion, 90 AM. ECON. A. PAPERS & PROC. 435 
(1978). 
135. Bechdolt, supra note 116. 
136. Black & Orsagh, supra note 87. 
137. Boyles & McPheters, Capital Punishment as a Deterrent to Violent Crime: Cross Sec• 
tional Evidence, 5 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 67 (1977). 
138. Passell, supra note 122. 
139. K. SHIN, supra note 120. 
Shin looks not only at the states in cross-section, but he also looks at a cross-section of 20 
countries. In this cross-section Shin finds the presence of capital punishment is significantly 
associated with higher homicide rates. However, these results might be substantially different 
if a different subset of countries had been examined or if additional controls, such as measures 
of police efficiency, had been available. Shin was only able to control for the_ inflation rate, 
percent urban population, degree of industrialization, the growth rate of the GNP, actual 
GNP, the unemployment rate, and the presence or absence of the death penalty. 
140. Cloninger, Deterrence and the Death Penalty: A Cross Sectional Analysis, 6 J. BEHA v-
IORAL ECON. 87 (1977). 
141. Ehrlich, supra note 83, at 741. 
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than his 1975 longitudinal study, but it has received much less atten-
tion. There has been no replication of this work, so it is difficult to 
determine how sensitive the analysis is to Ehrlich's choice of vari-
ables and functional form. Ehrlich candidly acknowledges a variety 
of problems with the data and the model. Taken together, the vari-
ous deficiencies mean that although we can admire Ehrlich's effort, 
he has again produced a piece that deserves little weight in the de-
bate on the deterrent effect of capital punishment. 
Some of the problems with the study are familiar. The deterrent 
effect of convictions is considerably stronger than the effect of execu-
tions given convictions, so that if there is a sufficient trade-off be-
tween the two we would not expect executions to deter even if 
Ehrlich's results are correct. Also, Ehrlich is not able to measure the 
length of imprisonment among those eligible for execution but not 
executed, so he is again addressing the wrong question.142 Most im-
portantly, the results do not unequivocally indicate that executions 
deter, and the coefficients of most control variables in the equations 
that do so indicate have surprising values, which suggest that the 
models are seriously misspecified. 
In Ehrlich's full sample of states, his execution variable is consis-
tently and significantly negative in its effect on homicide rates only 
when a dummy variable is used that distinguishes executing from 
nonexecuting states. The dummy indicates that executing states 
have significantly higher homicide rates than those that do not exe-
cute. Ehrlich suggests that this indicates the full model was mis-
specified. His preferred explanation is that, in assigning an 
arbitrarily low value of execution risk to nonexecuting states to allow 
logarithmic transformations of the execution risk variable, he under-
states the subjective risk of execution in those states.143 While this 
142. He does have a measure of median time spent in state prisons by murderers prior to 
first release, but the variable provides little or no information about the crucial .question: 
namely whether the deterrent effects of executed death sentences exceed that of sentences to 
life imprisonment. Medians are particularly inappropriate to this kind of evaluation. They 
are typically used where extreme scores make the mean a distorted measure of central ten-
dency. When we are interested in the relative efficacy of death sentences and life terms, we are 
interested only in the extreme prison terms. While Ehrlich doesn't say what crimes his murder 
category includes, it is likely that it includes, and it is probably dominated by, noncapital 
homicides. Furthermore, those sentenced to life and never released would not affect any meas-
ure based on time served before release from prison, while those released after many years 
(perhaps because life terms have been commuted) will reflect the sentencing patterns of years 
gone by. Yet Ehrlich's release data is only available for 1951. This is used in equations for 
both 1940 and 1950. 
143. One cannot take a log of zero. Thus Ehrlich's model cannot, strictly speaking, be 
tested if it purports to include states with no executions and incorporates the log of the execu-
tion risk variable. To test his model, Ehrlich follows common practice and replaces zero scores 
with arbitrarily low figures to allow the logarithmic transformations. This may be reasonable 
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may be true of nonexecuting death penalty states, it seems implausi-
ble when applied to the abolitionist states which form the bulk of the 
states with no executions in the years examined.144 Ehrlich's other 
explanation, that there are missing variables that differ significantly 
across executing and nonexecuting states, is an admission that the 
model is inadequate. 
Misspecification is also suggested by a number of Ehrlich's re-
sults which, although explained after the fact, do not point in the 
direction that one would intuitively expect. Generally speaking, 
Ehrlich finds that unemployment and labor force participation rates 
are not significantly· associated with homicide rates in either 1940 or 
1950, and the percentage of families with incomes below one half of 
the median income shows no significant association with homicides 
in 1940.145 The percentage of families in urban areas is negatively 
associated with homicide rates146 while the proportion of the popula-
tion between the ages of fifteen and twenty-four is negatively related 
to homicides in 1940 and not significantly related in 1950. Finally, 
states with higher median incomes tend to have higher homicide 
rates in both years; The only control variable that is consistently 
significant in what is indisputably the expected direction is the per-
centage of nonwhites in the population. 147 Although the deterrence 
variables are all in the predicted direction, a model which yields 
counterintuitive results on a number of theoretically important vari-
in death penalty states that have not executed in the years examined, since the fact that a state 
has a law providing for the death penalty may well mean that its citizens perceive some risk of 
execution for murder even though no one has been executed in the years examined or in the 
several preceding years. 
144. Where nonexecuting death penalty states are included, they have not executed for 
four or five years prior to the year examined, suggesting that the perceived risk of execution in 
these states would be quite low relative to the perceived risk in states that have executed. 
145. Ehrlich notes measurement problems with this variable and the median income varia-
ble for the year 1940. See Ehrlich, supra note 83, at 754 n.13. 
146. Since Ehrlich uses urban homicide rates as the dependent variable in most of his 
equations, he argues that percent urban population does not have its intuitive meaning but is a 
correcting factor. However, the relationship is the same for 1940 and insignificant for 1950 
when he replicates his results with state-wide homicide rates based on Vital Statistics data. My 
hunch is that this relationship exists because Ehrlich, unlike many who work with cross-sec-
tional data, does not include a dummy variable in his model to capture factors unique to the 
South. The South was likely to have been relatively rural during the periods examined but to 
have had high homicide rates in its urban areas. 
Ehrlich presents data by region pooled across the two time periods and indicates that the 
hypothesis of identical coefficients for Northern and Southern states cannot be rejected at the 
.05 level of significance. His choice of significance level is conventional, but the convention 
makes little sense when the null hypothesis is the favored one. One wants to know what the 
exact significance level is and one would like to know this for each period rather than for the 
pooled set. 
147. This summary is based on Ehrlich's results for the subset of executing states. Results 
are generally similar in the full set. 
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ables cannot be trusted with respect to results that are as pre-
dicted.148 Ehrlich's results are also suspect because the predicted 
trade-off of one execution for twenty to twenty-four lives is substan-
tially less consistent with the findings of other researchers than are 
his 1975 results.149 
Reading the econometric studies, including many that find no ev-
idence that executions deter, I am reminded of the story of the drunk 
who lost his keys one dark night. Although he thought he had lost 
his keys in the middle of the block, he looked for them at the comer 
because the light was better. If we assume a sufficiently black night, 
the drunk was not acting foolishly, for he certainly could not have 
found his keys in the dark. However, when he had good reason to 
believe the keys were elsewhere, he was unlikely to find them under 
the light. The econometricians who have searched for a deterrent 
effect of executions are a bit like that drunk. Their techniques re-
quire substantial light in the form of reliable data which is not only 
consistently associated with underlying concepts but is also available 
over time and across jurisdictions. The search for deterrence often is 
guided, quite understandably, by the availability of decent data 
rather than by those theoretical considerations which suggest fruitful 
places to look. Thus, cross-sectional research in the econometric tra-
dition often seeks to explain 1960 homicide rates even though execu-
tion rates had by then diminished so substantially that historically 
important deterrent effects might well have disappeared. This pref-
erence for a weak test of the deterrence hypothesis is explained by 
the fact that statewide census data for 1960 is richer than the data 
available for preceding census years. 
Longitudinal studies, on the other hand, tend to rely on national 
data even though theory suggests that it is state execution policies 
which are crucial, and we know that many states differ substantially 
from national norms. The specification of national models does not 
reflect a perverse preference for less powerful tests; it is all one can 
do when crucial state data are unavailable over time. Where the 
econometric modeling is more closely responsive to theory, as with 
Ehrlich 150 or Knorr, 151 the quality of the available data may pre-
148. For reasons I give in my effort to establish a common sense theoretical position, I also 
find Ehrlich's prediction of a deterrent effect to capital punishment intuitively implausible. 
Note that the kinds of demographic variables that are insignificant in Ehrlich's analysis or, 
arguably, away from the predicted direction, are usually more important in explaining homi-
cide rates than the deterrence variables. See, e.g., Bailey, supra notes 107-10. 
149. While I reject Ehrlich's results, I have more admiration for this effort than for his 
earlier work. He is sensitive to many of the problems that inhere in the available data and in 
the analyses they allow. 
150. Ehrlich, supra note 83, at 741. 
151. Knorr, supra n~te 114. 
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elude preferred techniques of model building and may lead to results 
that are suspect or even meaningless. 152 
I do not want to overstate this point. Where an econometric 
study appears generally sound, its results should not be quickly dis-
missed because of inevitable questions about theoretical choices or 
data quality. If the econometric studies generally revealed a deter-
rent effect associated with executions, this finding would have to be 
taken seriously. As it is, the body of econometric research over-
whelmingly favors the conclusion that executions do not deter. This 
evidence, together with the simpler but more revealing work of Sel-
lin and others and our initial theoretical perspective, is sufficient to 
justify the conclusion that capital punishment, as administered his-
torically in the United States, does not prevent more homicides than 
it may cause. Do we have absolute proof that capital punishment, as 
historically administered, does not save lives? No; we can never 
have such proof. But when we look at all the evidence, we find proof 
to a moral certainty. 
"Proof to a moral certainty" - as a social scientist I am uncom-
fortable in writing such words. Let me off er an example that conveys 
my meaning more precisely. Imagine a group of people living on the 
shores of a great lake who were convinced that their crops would be 
destroyed by a monster living in the lake unless each year one of 
their number were sacrificed to the monster. While they were civi-
lized enough to believe that killing was generally immoral, in this 
instance they thought the sacrifice justified by the harm it avoided. 
For years the sacrifices continued in the belief that they were 
needed to save large numbers from starvation. But at some point, as 
views about the causes of crop failure changed, a few people sug-
gested that perhaps there was no monster in the lake and the sacrifi-
cial killings served no purpose. Immediately the lake was dragged, 
albeit with a large mesh net. No monster was found, but the sacri-
fices went on. The mesh was too large to guarantee that there was no 
monster in the lake, and the risk that an existing monster had not 
been discovered was too great given the great harm that such a mon-
ster might do. Over the years other techniques were used to spot the 
monster. Sonar revealed nothing, nets with smaller and smaller 
152. For other difficulties with these approaches, see Brier & Feinberg, Recent Econometric 
Modeling of Crime and Punishment: Support far the .Deterrence Hypothesis?, 4 EVALUATION 
REv. 147 (1980); Fisher & Nagin, supra note 113; Gibbs, A Critique of tl1e Literature on Capital 
Punishment and .Deterrence, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL ECON. 279 (1977); Glaser, The Realities of Homi-
cide Versus Assumptions of Economists in Assessing Capital Punishment, 6 J. BEHAVIORAL 
ECON. 243 (1977). 
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mesh turned up nothing, divers saw nothing. Occasionally someone 
would report spotting the monster, but upon investigation these re-
ports always proved unreliable. Eventually a point was reached 
where the lake had been searched with reasonable care. Was it cer-
tain the monster was not there? No; there might be an unknown 
cave along the lake bottom that had not been searched, or the mon-
ster might have been so much smaller than people thought that it 
would not be recognized if seen, or it might be so small as to be 
undiscoverable by the techniques used. (Of course, the smaller the 
monster the less crops it would eat and the less people would suffer if 
the sacrifices stopped.) Still the sacrifices continued. People who 
had been raised on the myth (if it was a myth) of the monster and 
who had not closely followed the fruitless searches continued to be-
lieve the sacrifices necessary, particularly if they thought those sacri-
ficed had little right to live anyway. 
Yet, belief in the monster, however widespread, could not 
breathe life into a creature that had never been real or had long since 
died. Those concerned with the morality of the sacrifice came, some 
more reluctantly than others, to realize that they could no longer in 
good faith justify sacrificial deaths by the need to placate a crop-
eating monster. Despite the possibility that the searchers had missed 
an actual monster, enough unsuccessful attempts had been made to 
find the beast that the moral decision regarding the sacrifice had to 
proceed on the assumption that the monster was a myth. As the com-
munity leaders realized, taking life could not be forever justified by 
reference to a theory whose predictions continually failed to materi-
alize. The failure to find traces of the monster must at some point be 
dispositive in the moral debate - whatever the next search party 
might find. Otherwise there could be no good faith debate. 
This allegory captures what I mean when I write that, within the 
limits of historical patterns of execution, the failure of the death pen-
alty as a deterrent has been proved to a moral certainty. It may never 
be possible for social scientists to be certain that the death penalty 
does not deter homicide, 153 but there is now enough research that 
fails to reveal deterrence that for purposes of moral argument one 
must proceed as if the death penalty does not deter. 154 At some 
153. If there is a substantial brutalization effect to the death penalty it might be possible to 
say that if the death penalty deters, its deterrent effects are outweighed by its tendencies to 
encourage killing. 
154. For two papers that might be read as implying that this judgment may overstate the 
evidence, see Barnett, The .Detellent Effect of Capital Punishment: Yet Another Study, and 
Barnett, The .Detellent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Test of Some Recent Studies (unpub-
lished papers on file with the Michigan Law Review). The core of Barnett's argument is that 
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point possibilities become so mere that they cannot serve as a moral 
basis for action.155 This does not mean that research on capital pun-
ishment and deterrence should stop, nor can it guarantee that mat-
ters will always seem this way. 
CONCLUSION 
I have written at great length. Let me conclude briefly. Morally, 
there are two permissible bases for capital punishment - retribution 
and deterrence. Retribution, despite an honest appeal to human 
emotion, cannot justify a system of state executions inevitably 
tainted by mistake, bias, and caprice. Deterrence can justify capital 
punishment if systems of capital punishment save lives. There is lit-
tle reason to believe that the availability of capital punishment is -
except possibly in certain rare circumstances - a substantial margi-
nal deterrent. The empirical evidence is overwhelmingly to the con-
trary and is sufficiently strong and one-sided that we should 
executions have been so infrequent with respect to homicides and other influences on homicide 
rates are so important that one could not expect the econometric research to reveal deterrent 
effects of any likely magnitude. In terms of my allegory, it is as if all search parties were using 
nets whose mesh was larger than the monster they expected to find. "I think Barnett's papers 
are well worth reading, but I am not at this point sufficiently persuaded to change my judg-
ment on this matter. Barnett explicitly analyzes only three cross-sectional econometric studies. 
He does not consider time series research or approaches other than regression analysis. Also, 
from his perspective, which is shared by the econometricians he criticizes, it is the number of 
executions that makes the difference. His argument would not follow if the first execution 
were particularly important or if the presence of the death penalty made a substantial differ-
ence. Such effects, if they existed, might well be expected to be revealed in the data. For a 
judgment of the capacity of standard econometric approaches to shed light on the deterrent 
effects of capital punishment that is similar to Barnett's but based on different considerations, 
see Klein, Forst & Filatov, supra note 77. 
In reaching my judgment about the proper import of the evidence of deterrence for the 
moral debate, I am considering the role that arguments from deterrence should have on the 
issue of whether capital punishment is justified for first-degree murder generally or for some 
general subset (e.g., particularly heinous) of first-degree murders. I do not believe there is 
enough evidence or a sufficient theoretical basis to preclude, in the moral sense I describe in 
the text, the argument that the death penalty is likely to deter rather specific subsets of murders 
such as those committed by people serving life sentences. What little evidence we have about 
such situations does not suggest deterrence but is too insubstantial to outweigh the plausible 
theoretical case that supporters of capital punishment may offer. 
155. This, of course, does not preclude other moral bases for capital punishment such as 
retribution, but, as we have seen in Part I, the retributivist argument cannot justify a system for 
inflicting death that is biased or error prone. One might argue that if most of those executed 
deserve death one can make a moral case for the death penalty from deterrence even if the 
evidence suggesting deterrence is slight. I do not believe this is so. Slight evidence of deter-
rence is not the same as evidence of slight deterrence. The latter might justify the execution of 
some innocent people if this were necessary to secure the execution of many more guilty per-
sons and if the cumulative effect of all executions were great. The former does not allow 
execution because it provides little reason to believe that any executions do any good. Even if 
there were evidence of slight deterrence, retributivism would not allow the moral case for 
capital punishment to be based on such evidence if achieving that slight deterrence meant the 
mistaken sacrifice of innocent or not sufficiently culpable people. 
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approach the question of the morality of the death penalty with the 
assumption that capital punishment does not deter. Putting the two 
arguments together, we must conclude that, however great its intui-
tive appeal, the renewed effort to punish by death cannot withstand 
moral scrutiny.156 
APPENDIX 
In this appendix I would like to pursue the question of whether current 
retributivist justifications for the death penalty allow a system in which in-
nocent people will, on occasion, be found guilty and because of that mis-
take, be executed. At the outset, I want to make clear that I shall not be 
arguing that one could not construct a philosophy that values justice above 
innocent lives and concomitantly, allows "mistaken" executions. I shall ar-
gue that the modem retributivists have not done so and that such a position 
is inconsistent with certain positions they do or would take as well as with 
some of the bases of their argument for the death penalty. 
The opponent of capital punishment must admit that logic does not pre-
vent people from valuing incremental justice above innocent life, and that 
we may be comfortable in doing so if a substantial increment in justice may 
be achieved at the cost of a few lives. For example, even if deterrence were 
not a consideration, we might think it appropriate for police to risk their 
lives in efforts to apprehend fleeing felons. However, when the death pen-
alty is at issue, a special problem emerges which makes it difficult for re-
tributivists to argue by analogy from this and similar examples. 
The retributivist must show that for the special case of murder or for a 
special subset of murders, death is a more just sanction than life imprison-
ment. In the retributivist literature this showing is typically made by refer-
ence to the awesomeness of the crime - that is, to the evil of intentionally 
taking an innocent life - and to the intuition that in a just world such a 
crime demands the ultimate punishment. However, if the system which im-
poses the ultimate punishment cannot proceed without inevitably repli-
cating the momentous harm - the slaying of the innocent - that justifies 
such punishment, the basis for- ~e system is µndermined. 
Murder is a heinous crime in large measure because the harm to the 
victim cannot be undone or otherwise fully compensated. Whether we pun-
ish capitally or with life imprisonment, murder victims will not be resusci-
tated nor, putting aside the possible preventive effects of punishment, will 
other lives be saved. However, the decision not to allow capital punishment 
will save the lives of those innocent people and those less than fully culpa-
156. The reader will note that while I am bold in assessing the morality of systems of 
capital punishment I nowhere discuss their constitutionality. Those who believe that the Con-
stitution does not permit states to administer severe punishment without a sound moral basis 
will have little difficulty in drawing lessons for the Court from my argument. I, however, am 
not certain about the implications ofmy conclusions for the constitutional debate, for I am not 
convinced that the eighth amendment forbids all punishments that cannot withstand moral 
scrutiny or allows all punishments that can. Thus, the relevance of this paper for the Court 
depends not only on the soundness of the arguments advanced, but also on the developing 
jurisprudence of the eighth amendment. 
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ble killers who would have been mistakenly executed. Thus, the unique 
value of innocent life, which is used to derive a conception of justice that 
occasionally requires capital punishment, also argues against a system that 
allows such punishment; if a state punishes capitally it will inevitably com-
mit the terrible act necessary, in the retributivist scheme, to justify the kill-
ing of man. Furthermore, while state action cannot undo the harm caused 
by a murderer, the state is able, by rejecting capital punishment, to prevent 
additional harm which a retributivist would deplore. 
The above conclusions point to an anomaly in the moral case for capital 
punishment, but not, as I have noted earlier, to a logical inconsistency. One 
might construct a justification for capital punishment that allows the state 
to shed innocent blood if the incremental justice of shedding guilty blood 
were thought to be worth it. But such a case would not have the appeal of 
most current arguments for the death penalty, and hence it is rarely made. 
Among its other difficulties, such a case would require supporters of capital 
punishment to admit that they were willing to sacrifice some number of 
innocent lives to the end of promoting what they see as justice. This would 
conflict with the claim often found in the retributivist literature that a pun-
ishment system should respect human life as an end value and not treat it 
- even in the case of the culpable - as a means to some greater good. 
Retributivists will argue that the above discussion is vulnerable at least 
insofar as it assumes that inadvertent mistakes in the application of the 
death penalty are in some sense the moral equivalent of murder. For the 
retributivist this equation is misguided because a crucial element of the 
crime of murder - indeed the element that justifies the death penalty - is 
that the killing is intentional. Since the state does not intend to kill the 
innocent but strives mightily (albeit withou_t complete success) to ensure 
that this will not occur, the state cannot be held morally responsible for the 
death of the innocent in the way that a murderer can. 
This is an appealing argument, and I concede that it may be sound at 
the level of individual sentencing. A jury sentencing a man to death may 
not, if it has found the facts competently and in good faith, be held morally 
accountable for the wrong of condemning an innocent person. But the 
moralist who advocates a system of capital punishment is not in the same 
position as the juror who mistakenly condemns. Unless the moralist is ig-
norant of the history of capital punishment and of the fallibility of human 
beings, he knows that if the death penalty exists such mistakes are inevit-
able. If he intends to have a system of capital punishment, he intends to 
take innocent lives whether or not he wants to. Intentions are not defined 
by desires. 
The fact that the moralist does not know which of the executed will be 
innocent may be important at a sociological or psychological level - those 
who participate in or observe executions may be comfortable in their igno-
rance - but it offers little at the level of principle. If the retributivist's 
principles do not allow the intentional taking of the innocent life as a means 
to greater justice - and for most moral retributivists they do not - they 
will not justify a system that makes such takings inevitable. Those who 
think that modem retributivist philosophies allow this confuse the comforts 
of ignorance with justification in principle. Statistical thinking is not only 
thoughtful, it is, in its own way, precise. For modem man, treating the 
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statistically predictable as other than inevitable is a form of false conscious-
ness. The difference between the juror and the moralist is that even if the 
juror is mistaken he cannot be accused of bad faith when he claims that the 
person he has condemned is guilty; the moralist, on the other hand, cannot 
honestly say that the system he advocates kills only the guilty. In other 
words, the system advocate is responsible for knowing the parameters of 
punishment systems in a way that a juror - who is charged with evaluating 
just one person - is not. 
Perhaps it is belaboring what is obvious to some and obviously wrong to 
others, but I think it helpful to elucidate the above points with a series of 
examples. First, consider a situation which will be judged similarly by most 
participants in the debate. Assume a society in which, according to the ten-
ets of retributivism, ninety-eight people deserve to die. Unfortunately the 
populace is not accustomed to executions and will not punish the convicted 
by more than life imprisonment. However, if two innocent but unpopular 
members of the community were killed first, it would overcome the public's 
aversion to blood, and justice would be done in the other ninety-eight cases. 
Are we acting morally ifwe execute the two innocent people? Most retribu-
tivists would answer "no." We cannot take the lives of innocent persons to 
facilitate greater punishment and hence greater justice among a group of 
people who will be severely punished regardless. 
(Those who would allow innocent people to be executed in this hypo-
thetical situation might wish to stop here, for what follows assumes agree-
ment on this example. If a case for executing known innocents exists in the 
modem literature espousing retribution, I have not found it.) 
Does the moral situation change if we do not know which innocents we 
are killing? Suppose for example all one hundred prisoners are in a court-
yard and after being told that ninety-eight deserve to die but two are inno-
cent we are asked whether we would shoot all one hundred. I assume the 
answer will again be "no," for I can see no principled moral distinction 
between this situation and the situation where the two innocents are set 
before us to be shot first. In both situations we tolerate the killing of in-
nocents in order to more justly - by our retributivist principles - treat the 
guilty. In each case we do not want to kill the innocent, but everyone we 
kill we kill intentionally and in each case we intend a system designed ( al-
beit in small measure) to take innocent life. The fact that we did not want 
to design such a system does not mean we can close our eyes to what we 
have built. 
Nor is the moral situation changed by our taking steps that might pre-
vent the killing of the innocent so long as we know our steps will not be 
very effective. Suppose, for example, that two of our hundred prisoners 
were to be chosen at random to be freed and the rest executed. The hope 
would be that the two innocent prisoners would be freed and the ninety-
eight guilty executed, and it is indeed possible that this would happen. But 
this happy coincidence would be unlikely in any given group, and its con-
tinual repetition would be virtually impossible if we executed enough 
groups of one hundred. Again, it is difficult to distinguish this situation 
from our first case. In neither one do we want to kill innocent people, but 
in both we have to if we are going to execute the guilty, and in both we 
intend a system that will have this effect. 
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Finally, we may try hard to develop a system that sorts the guilty from 
the innocent. If the system selects people for execution without error or 
with only lenient errors it would be morally permissible on retributivist 
principles. Indeed, if intentionality is crucial, so long as we could believe in 
good faith that our system worked without error it might be morally per-
missible to execute those it condemned. However, as evidence accumulated 
that innocent men have been erroneously killed despite systemic precau-
tions and as we developed insight into sources of human fallibility (e.g., the 
vagueries of eyewitness identification) that made error inevitable, we would 
find it increasingly difficult to distinguish the morality of this system from 
our first universally condemned example. In each case we intentionally 
construct a system that we know will necessarily execute the innocent how-
ever little we desire this result. We may be comforted by the fact that with 
our new safeguards we are making fewer than two errors in a hundred, but 
this should not amount to a moral difference. Modem retributivist philoso-
phy does not suggest that our reaction to the situation originally hypothe-
sized should be different if but one innocent person had to be executed to 
pave the way for the execution of 999 people who deserved death. 
In any system of capital punishment we do not know what the error 
proportion is. I would be astonished if we executed people who did not 
participate in killings as frequently as two percent of the time. However, 
retributivism graduates penalties by blameworthiness, even when the of-
fense is homicide. I would not be surprised if far more than two percent of 
our executions involved people whose mental state at the time they killed 
was not sufficiently culpable as to justify the death penalty by prevailing 
retributivist standards. Our justice system probably does a lot better in 
identifying killers than it does in measuring intentionality. 
There is a doctrine of Catholic moral philosophy that might appear to 
give comfort to those who wish to argue that the last of my examples 
presents a system that as a moral matter is different in kind from the others 
I describe. This is the so-called doctrine of double effect. This doctrine is 
thought by some distinguished philosophers to be invalid. H.L.A. Hart, for 
example, writes that the doctrine "is used to draw distinctions between 
cases in a way ... puzzling to me and to many other secular moralists."1 
Commenting on specific cases distinguished by the doctrine, Hart con-
cludes: ''There seems to be no relevant moral difference between them on 
any theory of morality."2 Philippa Foot is more sympathetic but ultimately 
critical as well.3 But the decision to reject the doctrine is not crucial to my 
case. Even if it is accepted, it does not provide the moral basis needed to 
distinguish my fourth example from my first. 
The thrust of the doctrine of double effect is perhaps best understood by 
example. To borrow one from Foot,4 suppose a man, A, is dying and can 
only be saved by a dose of some rare drug. However, five other men, B, C, 
.D, E, and F, are also dying and each can be saved by one fifth of a dose of 
I. H. HART, Intention and Punishment, in PuNISHMENT AND REsPONSIBILITY 113, 122 
(1968). 
2. Id at 124. 
3. P. FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES (1978). 
4. Id 
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that same drug. Ifwe give the drug toB, C,.D,E, andF, thus doomingA, 
we would not be held accountable for a moral wrong. Indeed, even though 
we knew A would die because of our choice, most would argue that we 
were morally compelled to choose as we did. On the _other hand, suppose 
the five could only be saved by killing a healthy man, G, and distilling a 
serum from his blood. Again we have the opportunity to trade one life for 
five, but most would agree that we would be acting immorally if we did so. 
The doctrine of double effect explains our different moral reactions to 
the two situations. In the first situation, the death of A was no part of our 
plan to save the others; we simply knew it had to happen if we made the 
choice. In Bentham's terminology A's death was an "oblique" rather than a 
"direct" intention. In the second example, G's death was an essential part 
of our plan to save the others. Had we killed him, albeit in a good cause, it 
would have been with the direct intention of doing so. 
The defender of capital punishment who wishes to rely on the doctrine 
of double effect might similarly argue that in his preferred system there is 
no desire to kill the innocent. Any "intention" to do so is only oblique and 
not part of his design to achieve justice. However, there are at least two 
reasons why the "double effect" argument does not morally justify a system 
of capital punishment that inevitably kills innocent people even if it pro-
vides a satisfactory basis for other moral choices that necessarily doom the 
innocent. 
First, the double-effect doctrine is one of the last resort; it is typically 
used to justify decisions where death or some equivalent horror is ines-
capable no matter what the choice. Thus, if in our example B, C, .D, E, and 
F would not die if the drug were given to A, but would instead suffer pain 
while awaiting the next shipment of the drug, the doctrine of.double effect 
would not allow us to prefer alleviating the group's pain to saving A from 
death. The choice of whether to allow the death penalty is like this last 
example. If we allow it innocent people will certainly die, but if we don't 
allow it, not only will we save the innocent, but our failure to execute those 
who deserve to die does not mean that they go unpunished. Murderers are 
punished severely if they are imprisoned for life. Thus, when the desirabil-
ity of a system of capital punishment is at issue we are not confronted by 
the dilemma that legitimates moral justification by reference to the doctrine 
of double effect. 
Second, as Philippa Foot nicely points out, the distinction between di-
rect and oblique intention plays only a subsidiary role in explaining our 
reaction to the difficult problems the double-effect doctrine appears to re-
solve. The distinction between avoiding injury and bringing aid is far more 
crucial to our moral judgment.5 The former obligation is substantially 
stronger than the latter. Thus, Foot postulates the situation of five people in 
a hospital whose lives could be saved by the manufacture of a certain gas 
that unfortunately but inevitably releases lethal fumes into the room of an-
other patient whom for some reason we are unable to move. That patient's 
death is clearly an unintended side effect of the action we want to take and 
in this sense it is similar to the situation of A, who will be denied a rare 
S. Id at 29. 
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drug. Yet, morally the decision to save the .five and doom A is far less 
troubling than the decision to manufacture a gas that we know will kill a 
bystander. In the one case we are failing to avert a tragedy that cannot be 
averted except at the cost of greater grief. In the other case we are know-
ingly sacrificing (Foot says "using") a person for a system that can only 
benefit others. 
Systems of capital punishment are like Foot's case of the lethal gas. We 
are knowingly using the lives of some innocent people (j.e., not avoiding 
injury) to maintain a system that will allow the deaths of others who, in our 
view, deserve that fate. True, the analogy would be more exact if we did 
not know until after we manufactured the gas whether the poisoned room 
was occupied, and it turned out that it often was not or did not appear to be. 
However, once we had sufficient experience to know the room was some-
times inadvertently and unwillingly occupied and there was nothing we 
could do about it, the moral quality of the decision to allow the gas to be 
made is the same, except insofar as utilitarian considerations would lead us 
to evaluate matters differently if the proportion of people saved to people 
killed was greater. Thus, those circumstances that typically coincide with 
intentionality and give the doctrine of double effect its intuitive appeal do 
not upon close analysis strengthen the moral case of those who advocate the 
death penalty in an imperfect world. It does not allow us to distinguish 
morally between our original hypothetical in which two people were know-
ingly sacrificed to enable us to kill ninety-eight who deserved death and our 
fourth hypothetical in which we knew for certain that innocent people 
would be killed if we had the death penalty, but we did not desire their 
deaths or know before the fact who they would be. 
To say that there are no moral distinctions between these two cases is 
not to say that there are no important distinctions. As individuals and as a 
society we are clearly going to be more comfortable with the fourth situa-
tion than with the .first. In the one we are capable of deceiving ourselves 
and in the other we are not. This difference has important implications. 
For one thing, it will be easier to hire executioners and to secure partici-
pants at other stages of the condemnatory process if the innocent do not 
stand out as such. For another, the claimed value of the innocent life is less 
obviously contradicted in the fourth situation than in the .first, so society 
might get away with treating each execution as an affirmation of the 
supreme value of the innocent life rather than as an event that is only possi-
ble because innocent lives are not supreme. 
However, these advantages of the fourth system over the .first are psy-
chological and sociological. Unless we are willing to reduce morality to 
what is sociologically and psychologically comfortable, they are not part of 
a principled moral theory. In other settings the committed retributivist 
would be the last to confuse what feels comfortable with what is right. We 
need only consult the classic list of deadly sins to know that the comfortable 
is often wrong. Retributivism cannot find refuge here. Indeed, if philo-
sophical consistency is the test, most modem retributivists can find refuge 
only in systems that assume away the imperfections of the world. As Wal-
ter Berns, a noted defender of the death penalty wrote: 
Whether the United States, or any of them, should be permitted to carry 
out executions is a question that is not answered simply by what I have 
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written here [in the defense of the death penalty]. The answer depends on 
our ability to restrict its use to the worst of our criminals and to impose it 
in nondiscriminatory fashion. We do not yet know whether that can be 
done.6 
One must admire Berns for his frank recognition of reasons why the re-
tributivist case for the death penalty, which he makes as eloquently as any-
one, has no necessary moral implications for actual decisions on how to 
punish murder. My only criticism is that we do know whether what he 
thinks necessary can be done. The history of capital punishment, theories 
of human fallibility, and our experience following Furman tell us that 
Berns's conditions have never been met and give us no reason to suppose 
they ever will be. 
6. Berns, ./Jeftnding the ./Jeath Penalty, 26 CRIME & DELIQUENCY 503, 511 (1980). 
